(You can download the entire article in a nicely formatted pdf doc from the above embedded file. The WordPress format has changed for the worse and I am going to update the long-form article over a couple of days. Figures are missing from the article below and will be added over the next few days.)
In recent years there has been an upsurge in awareness of how the British looted Bharat. One of the most popular statistics is that Britian stole $45 trillion from Bharat. This statistic rose to prominence with the Indian External Affairs minister Dr. Jaishankar’s statement in Washington DC in 2019 (ThePrint 2019). Scratching the surface, we find that this figure was first proposed by Prof. Usha Patnaik (Chakrabarti and Patnaik 2017) and is based on the financial chicanery that the British employed to suck money out of India to fund their industrial revolution and wars for close to 200 years.
This figure is an excellent start to compute the drain of wealth from Bharat but is incomplete as it does not include the earnings lost by Indians due to forced labor, loot of Indian cities and kingdoms after each war, use of up to a million women as sex slaves in army camps and public brothels, and the revenue extortion from farmers for 180 years.
Coming back to the point, one of the key contributors to the $45 trillion was the land revenue (i.e., land tax) extorted from Bharatiya farmers. In this monograph, I have selected Tirunelveli district in Tamil Nadu to demonstrate the kind of loot the British carried out and its terrible consequence on Indian farmers. The loot from Tirunelveli makes up a small portion of $45 trillion drained from Bharat by the British.
Kailasavasi Dharampal had collected revenue data for 150 years for Tirunelveli district from different British era sources (Dharampal 2011), the chief of which was the “Manual of the Tinnevelly District” published in 1879 (Stuart 1879). This Manual has the revenue data till 1879; after this year Dharampal used different settlement reports to complete the data series till 1947 CE.
However, in Dharampal’s data there is a gap of 20-30 years which I have tried to plug using sources which are available online (thanks to the internet revolution!). The chief of these sources is the “Reports on the Settlement of Land Revenue in the District of Madras Presidency” for various years and the report on agriculture statistics published by the Government of Madras (Statistics 1963).
Note on the articles structure: I have given a brief overview of the history and geography of Tirunelveli district at the beginning of this article. I have kept the background sections short as the main purpose is to illustrate the devastating effects of the British revenue extortion. If you are interested in learning in-depth about the history of Tirunelveli district, I would encourage you to refer to books such as the Gazetteers which give detailed information on this topic. I have not made the distinction between the English East India Company (EEIC) and the British Crown, as this is simply semantics. Due to force of habit, I have used the terms Bharat and India interchangeably in the article.
Figure 1 Map of Madras Presidency circa 1909 with Tirunelveli (Tinnevelly) district at the bottom right
The map in Figure 1 shows the size of the district in 1909, when it was known as Tinnevelly. The district has gone through many divisions in the last 200 years and its current size is roughly half of its 19th century version. Present day Tirunelveli district is in the shape of a wedge and is bounded by Kanyakumari on its left, Thoothukudi on its right, and Tenkasi on its head.
Tirunelveli is unique geographically in the sense that it bounded by the Bay of Bengal on its Eastern side, by the Western Ghats on its western side. This gives a good variety in terrain with forests, barren land, and saline sand deserts on its coastal periphery.
The Western Ghats are 1000 to 3500 feet high and covered with a variety of evergreen forest (Statistics 1963). The Tambraparni is the key river which flows through the district for around 185 kilometers before joining the ocean. There are several dams (called anicuts) across the Tambraparni and several streams from the Western Ghats (Statistics 1963). The soil along the river plains is rich black soil, whereas the coastal belt is sand and covered with palm trees.
For a greater part of the last 650 years, Tirunelveli was a part of the Vijayanagar empire. From 1600’s onwards, with the weakening of the Vijayanagar empire, their military commanders the Nayakas of Madura, became de-facto rulers. They were great rulers and warriors and kept the administration and revenue system going as per tradition.
With the 1700’s there was a weakening of authority and in 1736 a Muslim mercenary, Chanda Sahib (son-in-law of the so-called Nawab of Arcot), deposed the last Nayaka Queen Meenakshi by deceit and took over the district. But the local Hindu chieftains known as Palaiyakkarars in Tamil and Palegaru in Telugu (corrupted to Poligars by the English) gave the Muslim despot a hard time in revenue collection.
From 1750’s onwards it was the English who called the shots as far as revenue collection was concerned. As the Nawab of Arcot increasingly went into their debt, they gradually took over the revenue collection. Thus, out of the 26 administrators deputed by the Nawab from 1739 to 1800, the last two were Europeans. This tyranny was ferociously resisted by the Palaiyakkarars, such as the great Veerapandiya Kattabomman, till the East India Company destroyed them after a hard campaign around 1801. The last great Palegaru who fought against the British was Uyyalawada Narasimha Reddy from Andhra Pradesh who led a small army in the 1840’s and was finally hanged in 1847 by the British.
Before 1801 CE, a major part of the district was ruled by Palegars. They were the bulwark of resistance against the Nawab and the British atrocities and prevented the farmers from being bled to the bone by the British. It is no surprise that the British lovingly referred to them as “free-booters” and “desperate marauders” who extorted money from the people (Stuart 1879). It is pertinent to note that the Marathas was also derided as freebooters and the Maratha Admiral (Sarnaubat) Kanhoji Angre was labeled a pirate by the British. The palegars were essentially local kings who had their own estates known as palaiyams and also looked after a certain number of villages. They ran an independent administration with taxes, land revenue, and local police known as desakaval. Later British revenue officers lamented that the Palegars usurped large amounts of revenue from the sirkar (government) villages (H.R. Pate 1917). Extortion of course was the British right!
Till 1792 CE, the Nawab had nominal control over the district and appointed revenue officers known to the British as “Renters”. This was a strange breed which was despised by the people and was responsible for collecting the revenue from the sirkar villages while the palegars were responsible for revenue collections from their palaiyams. From 1799 to 1805 the British formally took over the region. In 1799, after a fierce battle, the British murdered the palegar of Panajalankurichi and began dismantling the indigenous military and civilian infrastructure. The estates of six palegars of Panjalankurichi, Kulattur, Kadalgudi, Elayirampannai, Kolarpatti and Nagalapuram were split-up and large parts distributed to loyal collaborators as bakshish. This led to the consolidation of a lot of land in two or three palegars who were later styled as Zamindars of Ettaiyapuram, Maniyachi, and Melmandai by the British.
The smug pompous attitude of the British is reflected in the comment by Lushington in 1800, where he says that:
“ The nature of the permanent settlement and of the system of law and security by which it is to be enjoyed by themselves and handed down to their posterity has been repeatedly explained to the poligars; and they now wait with anxious solicitude the confirmation of a blessing which is to soften them to the remembrance of former sacrifices.” (H.R. Pate 1917)
From 1805, began a long and terrible time for the district as the British devastated the district with their rapaciousness.
The district gets rain twice every year: a) During the North-East monsoon from October to December; and b) The South-East monsoon from June to September. It is the North-East monsoon which is the main one in terms of rainfall. The average annual rainfall till 1955 was around 1244mm ( 49 inches) (Statistics 1963), whereas the data from 1970 to 2015 shows a marked decrease to around 752 mm (29 inches) (P Arumugam 2016). The coastal districts get more rain than the inland areas.
The one fact you should understand about the pre-British land revenue especially under Hindu rulers was that it was collected in kind not in cash. The farmers handed over to the rulers a part of their produce, this part could vary from 10% to 30% of what they reaped in a year. If the rains failed or drought struck, the amount they handed over went down proportionate to the harvest. Another aspect was that the rulers were flexible in their demand and if the conditions were unfavorable for farmers the demand was reduced. Prior to 1739, Tirunelveli was under indigenous Hindu rulers and the prosperous state of things is illustrated by this comment from A.J Stuart, who compiled the 1879 manual for Tirunelveli district:
“All we know is that its last four centuries produced the temples and the irrigation works of Tinnevelly. A Government whose wealth and whose tastes are manifested by the temples and statues of Tinnevelly, and whose readiness to employ all its resources for the benefit of its people, as proved by the number and nature of the irrigation works which it completed, implies a contented and prosperous people ; while a high state of the arts and of knowledge is abundantly testified by the exquisite design and workmanship discoverable in many of the temples and Statues, as well as by the grasp and mastery of the principles of irrigation, a complicated and difficult branch of the engineering are displayed in their irrigation system.” (Stuart 1879)
The system of land rights had been in existence for thousands of years and involved a complicated arrangement where the land rights were distributed between the village, individual farmers, tradesmen (barber, blacksmith, weavers etc.), and entire jatis (not castes!) engaged in a specific occupation (Mustafa 2007). The beauty of the system was that the non-agricultural classes such as the village chowkidars had a share in the harvest, thus ensuring their survival even in hard times. Land was regarded as a hereditary possession, and it was a rare occurrence for someone to be dispossessed of their land for non-payment of dues. Even the Raja did not have sole rights over the land, while he could demand tribute and revenues in kind, he did not have the right to kick-out the farmers. Land had no sale value even till the mid-19th century.
Another interesting aspect of the pre-British administration in villages was the Kaval system. This was the Bharatiya system of law enforcement in rural Tamil Nadu and came about during the rule of the Vijayanagar empire. This system functioned by dividing policing duties into different aspects such as protection of crops, people, animals, and property. This system was financed by taxes collected for each aspect. Thus, Desakaval was a tax to employ an armed force to protect a group of villages, sthala kaval was the tax to protect a particular village and so on. The local police or Kavalkarars were the support system for the Palegars as well. Thus, when the English destroyed the Palegars, they took active steps to tranquilize the Kavalkarars. This led to a prolonged struggle which ended with the Kavalkarars becoming criminals and classed as by the British in 1917 as a “criminal tribe”.
While the British destroyed the Palegers by 1801 CE, they did not stop collecting the desakaval fees and also took over the revenues from all sources such as land revenue, the salt, sayar (a type of sugar/gur), and abkari (alcohol).
Troubled times started when the region went under the Nawab of Arcot, who made himself ruler by deceiving the last of the Nayaka rulers of Madurai. The Renters appointed by the Nawab were responsible for collecting the revenue from the Palegars and villages which did not come under Paleger rule. There were 26 renters in the 62 years rule of the Nawab. The prominent characteristics of the renters were (H.R. Pate 1917):
Extorted over 80% of the produce from farmers by dubious means including torture.
Forced farmers to repair tanks, canals, river embankments etc. for free.
Everything that the farmer owned could be usurped by the renter including his house, cattle etc.
If the farmer reaped the harvest without the renter’s permission, an army of peons would beat the daylights out of him and confiscate his meagre share.
The Sirkar or the ruler had the first right to sell their share, this was done to get the maximum market price. The farmer could not sell till the Sirkar had sold their share.
If he wanted to sell at the district markets, which was quite a task before automobiles came along, he would have to pay a toll tax every 10 miles. Between Nagapattinam and Palakkad fort, a distance of 398 kilometers, there were more than 30 such toll booths.
The renter caused localized famine by hoarding grain, prohibiting its sale and selling at exorbitant prices during scarcity.
In case the people resisted his tyranny, he could call upon military back-up.
Now who does this sound familiar to…? The renter whom the Gazetteer decries is a carbon copy of the British revenue officials!
In 1781 CE, the East India Company got the right to collect revenue from the Nawab. The Company became for all practical purposes the ruler of the region (H.R. Pate 1917). The Company appointed revenue collectors known as Receivers and this species was above the Nawabs renter in the food chain. In 1783, the renters were dismissed, and the receiver took full control of the district. This on-off situation continued till 1790, when the renters were finally cut out from the chain.
The British created a system of bureaucracy whose sole purpose was to extract revenue from the land. Except for a few exceptions, every British collector “maximized” revenue collection, to the extent that even lands which were not cultivated were subject to land tax. For example, if a farmer had 10 acres of fertile land but cultivated only 5 acres and left the remaining area fallow, the British would tax the entire 10 acres at the same tax rate.
Even during the early years of British occupation, till the 1830’s, existing landlords acted as a buffer between the merciless revenue demands and the smaller farmers. However, by 1890’s this class was destroyed by British policies and the stereotype blood-sucking zamindar from Hindi movies had taken their place. This is illustrated by an incident recounted by a Tehsildar, Chentsal Rao in Raghavaiyangar’s book (Raghavaiyangar 1893):
“My grandfather once told me that when he was a tahsildar, the collector having on one occasion called upon him to expediate the revenue collection and intimated that if he did not remit at least Rs.50,000 within a week, he would be dismissed. A single ryot paid all money in advance and received it afterwards from the ryots in his taluk. Such men of wealth and influence over the ryots do not now exist.”
The most fundamental difference between the Bharatiya tradition and the British was that they saw themselves as the real owners of the land and everyone else as “tenants” who were free to farm so long as they could pay the “rent” in the form of land revenue (Mustafa 2007). In that era, the standard term to refer to the British occupation was the “Government”. The British did not recognize the hereditary rights in existence as their only aim was to maximize the revenue collection.
From 1801 till the early 1900’s, the British experimented with different systems to try and maximize the land revenue. Each innovation had its own disastrous effect on the farmers and a land of plenty was reduced to bare subsistence. Mustafa has correctly pointed out that, “from 1801, the demand for land revenue was more than what the renter or tenant could bear. Revenue had to be collected forcibly in many places in Chittoor as well as other parts of the Madras Presidency” (Mustafa 2007).
Things were made worse by the destruction of Indian industry and trades by the British Occupation. The only survival avenue left for millions of people was agriculture and this led to a fragmentation of farms and micro farm sizes (less than an acre).
By the time the British ran from Bharat there were three mixed-up systems of revenue collection in Madras Presidency: a) Ryotwari; b) Zamindari; and c) Inamdari (Mustafa 2007). By 1947 CE, agricultural productivity had gone through the floor, millions had been wiped out in famines, the countryside stripped bare, traditional industries annihilated, and millions of acres rendered infertile.
The graphs and explanation are for the ryotwari lands which contributed between 80-85% of the total land revenue. As the Zamindari and Inam lands were taxed under different parameters these have been excluded from the write-up.
I have followed Dharampal’s system of converting the land revenue from rupees per acre to kilos per acre. This gives a better idea of the actual burden on the farmers. I have discussed this approach in detail in the next section.
Brutalization of Indians was institutionalized by the British occupation to the extent that even third-rate government peons held powers of life and death over the farmers. By the mid-19th century, the British officers had “outsourced” torture to their Indian quislings. While the white occupation kept its snout in the trough by murders, rapes, slavery, and random brutalization, this was rarely recorded as the British were quite particular about keeping-up their image clean amongst their peer Anglo-Saxons. What Indians thought did not matter as they were “savages”.
Another fundamental, though rarely mentioned aspect, is that in a criminal case, only a white person could testify against another white man. You don’t need to be a genius to figure out the chances of that happening. Thus over 90% of the rapes, custodial murders, and inhuman torture went undocumented but there were some exceptions such as the Madras Torture Commission report of 1855 CE.
The report was the result of a Commission set up under orders from the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London to address the growing outcry in Britain against widespread torture practiced by the revenue and police departments (Bhuwania 2008). It was the revenue department which was responsible for the majority of cases of torture while the police department was pretty much a sideshow. The number of false confessions made by people under torture can be seen from the fact that during 1853-55, around 1696 people retracted their confession before the sessions court and around 53% were released by the court (Presidency 1855).
The cases brought by the victims against the low-level Indian enforcers were usually dismissed by the Collectors and Courts. This even though 90% of cases were never reported as people were cowed into submission by the British Occupation.
It is a flawed document and like most documents from the British Occupation, it will be a mistake to take it at its face value. The fundamental flaw lies in its mission statement which absolves Europeans (this was the term used to describe White people whether English, Irish, Scottish or from mainland Europe) and fixes all blame on the Indian underlings. This was really a whitewash commission, whose main aim was to absolve Europeans from the blame and pin the guilt on the Indian minions.
I have selected a few cases from the report which are from Tirunelveli as they are relevant to this monograph. As I progress through different districts of Tamil Nadu, I will present two instances of torture for the relevant district.
Case 1 from 1855: Vanamurthi Nada Pillai was a farmer from Tirunelveli district whose crops failed in 1854 due to poor rainfall. Due to this he was unable to meet the land revenue demands and applied for remission. However, the tahsildar, Appavoo Moodelly[1] proceeded to torture them in the following manner:
“I and others were placed in charge of peons who used to take us out in the sun; sometimes to a rock on the north of our town, and at other times to the sand near the hill. There we were made to stoop and stones were put on our backs, and (we) were kept in the burning sand. After 8 o’clock at night we were let go to our rice.” (Presidency 1855)
This torture continued for 3 months despite Vanamurthi petitioning the Collector, who simply refused to accept them. He then approached the sessions court which sent the petitions to the Collector, where it was stonewalled. Instead, the revenue officers served a notice of arrears on Vanamurthi, and his property was sold off to recover the dues. The women of the household were molested, and a painful torture device called a “kittee” (a thumbscrew, which seems to be a clamp which creates very high pressure on the body part) was applied to their breasts during torture.
Case 2 from 1854: Kailasa Pillai of Ambasamudram was tortured by the tahsildar Appa Moodelly (might be Appa Mudaliar, perhaps same tahsildar from Vanamurthi’s case). Kailasa Pillai had leased lands to a peon called Teroovian Pillai (?) from another tahsil, Suvaranamadavi, on the condition that the land revenue portion (known as the Circar Kist) and Svami-bhogam (the owners share) was paid yearly. In the third year Terrovian Pillai defaulted and paid only a portion of the land revenue. After trying to recover dues, Kailasa leased the land to another tenant, Nullakunoo.
In a grotesque twist, the amount, which was due by Terrovian Pillai, was demanded by the tahsildar for Suvaranamadavi, Appa Mudaliar, from Kailasa as he was the owner of the land. Appa Mudaliar got the tahsildar for Kailasa’s area to detain him till the dues were paid. Additionally, the peons of the tahsildar of Suvarnamadavi imprisoned and beat up the new tenant, Nullakunoo, set fire to his house, and molested his women. Nullakunoo suffered a loss of Rs.150, which in today’s rate equals to 5 lakh rupees. Kailasa sent his minor son to Appa Mudaliar to sort the matter out and when that didn’t work, he approached Appa Mudaliar. On this occasion Kailasa was subjected to:
“(The tahsildars peons) Abused me disgracefully and beat me in front of his katcheri (office), exposing me to the sunshine in a stooping posture. The tahsildar ordered his peons to take me to the public street, where the temple chariot (ratha) use to pass, and there to beat me and abuse me disgracefully, exposing me to the sunshine and laughter of the mob throughout the whole day in a stooping posture with a heavy rock on my back.” (Presidency 1855)
Figure 3 Land revenue per acre in rupees, TIrunelveli district 1801-1947 CE
Looking at the graph (Figure 3) for land revenue per acre in rupees, it doesn’t look like there was a lot of burden on the farmer. For land revenue based on estimated cultivated area, the average revenue per acre in rupees till 1947-48 comes to Rs 2.80. Similarly, the average revenue per acre based on actual cultivated area comes to Rs 3.18. Looking at this data, there is a solitary peak of Rs.5.32 in 1859-60 CE, other than that it mostly fluctuates between 2-3 rupees per acre.
Dharampal in his notes (Dharampal 2011) has pointed out the correct way of understanding the magnitude of the land revenue paid to the British Occupation. And that method is to convert the rupees per acre into the equivalent quantity of grain i.e., paddy in this case. This quantity will give a rough idea of why the farmers were bled to the bone in the British occupation.
Figure 4 Estimated land revenue from the Ryotwari system converted into kilos of paddy.
Looking at Figure 4, for the first 60 years of British occupation (1801-1860 CE) the farmer was converting anywhere between 30-53% of his produce into cash to pay the British revenue farmers. Thus, if we assume the average produce to be 547 kilos per acre, the farmer had to forgo around 273 kilos as revenue to the British occupation. This is a very significant amount and when other costs such as cost of cultivation, rent to the landlord (if the farmer did not own the land), wastage, food for his survival etc. are taken out, there is hardly anything left. For the average farmer the question of profit simply did not arise, there was hardly any food left to tide over droughts and famines. This is the key reason that people in villages died in their millions during 150 years of British occupation.
I have assumed the average produce per acre over 150 years as 547 kilos which comes to around 1205 lbs. This is based on Dharampal’s estimate. The British assumptions of yield were unrealistically high, and the tax was set to these hypothetical figures. For example, in Ajmer, as late as the early 1900’s, the assumed yield was on average 23% more than the actual yield (M.S.Jain 1994). The yield per acre itself is a problematic thing as every piece of land will have a different yield depending on a host of factors. There are different figures for the yield per acre, I have discussed this problem in brief in the Appendix.
The British experimented with different revenue systems as their aim was to maximize revenue collection. There were some minor changes after 1860 CE, partly because of the war of 1857 CE, but by this time 2-3 generations of Indians had been stripped to the bone and millions of acres had become wasteland.
While the land tax was very high it is only part of the full picture. For a non-agricultural person like me it was quite difficult to understand the disastrous long-term effect of the land tax till I understood the costs of cultivation.
Based on inputs from my sister Dr. Archana Kale, who is an agricultural scientist, and the cost of cultivation reports for different years brought out by the Government of India, I have pegged the cost of cultivation at a conservative 70% (Directorate of Economics and Statistics 2007), (Directorate of Economics & Statistics 2017). Going by the 2021-22 statistics, the cost of cultivation comes to around 67%, while that for 2022-23 is 76% (Welfare 2021). In the older reports, especially from the late 1990’s, the cost comes to more than 80%. My assumption is close to the cost of cultivation in the 19th century, and this is attested by La Touches’ underestimated figure of 67% for Ajmer region in 1870’s (M.S.Jain 1994).
What does the cost of cultivation involve? The agricultural statistics reports typically divide the costs into 14 main categories, called cost concepts (Directorate of Economics and Statistics 2007):
Value of hired human labor
Value of hired bullock labor
Value of owned bullock labor
Value of owned machinery labor
Hired machinery charges
Value of seed (both farm produced and purchases)
Value of insecticides and pesticides
Value of manure (owned and purchased)
Value of fertilizer
Depreciation on implements and farm buildings
Irrigation charges
Land revenue, cesses and other taxes
Interest on working capital
Miscellaneous expenses
A few of these cost concepts, such as insecticides or machinery, will be inapplicable to the 19th century and the early 20th century context. However, most of the remaining cost headers are the same as they were in 1801 or 1947 CE. Fertilizers (organic or chemical), seeds, labor, animal power are constant across the time continuum. From where we stand in the 21st century, it would be very difficult to get a reliable estimate of the cost of cultivation over 120 years ago, the best we can do is to form an approximation based on current data.
In the early years of British occupation, no allowance was made for the farmers cost of cultivation or his profit. It was only after the 1850’s when decades of distress destroyed the farmers financial capacity that small deductions, usually in the range of 15-20%, were made by the British (Raghavaiyangar 1893). To say this was inadequate is an understatement. Raghavaiyangar’s correctly points out that:
“Moreover, the settlement calculations do not, ostensibly at all events, make allowances for the liability of the ryot to pay a fixed cash assessment in all seasons whether the crop he reaps is abundant, or so scanty as to be hardly sufficient for his subsistence. It is well known that poor ryots who borrow grain from sowkars or the richer ryots in the cultivation season have to repay at the harvest, i.e., in 6 or 8 months, the quantity borrowed together with an additional amount varying from 25 to 50 per cent. When the crop fails and payment has to be postponed to the next harvest the additional quantity payable is, of course, proportionately increased.” (Raghavaiyangar 1893)
In the following sections, I have divided the 147-year period from 1801 to 1947 CE into different blocks of years based on the type of revenue system implemented by the British. The key revenue systems were:
The Amani system (1801-1809 CE)
The Decennial Lease system (1809-1821 CE)
The Olungu System (1821-1859 CE)
Puckle Durai’s Settlement (1859-1905 CE)
The Final Phase (1905-1947 CE)
Before we go into the details of the different British experiments with our money, we need to understand how land was classified for revenue purposes. In practical terms, land was divided into 2 categories for purposes of land revenue:
Wet land: This was land which had easy access to good sources of water such as rivers, streams, tanks, lakes etc. This was the most fertile land and farmers sowed anywhere between 2-4 crops a year. For Indian rulers, including the so-called Nawabs, wet land was taxed by dividing the produce between the Sarkar and the farmers (H.R. Pate 1917). This practice lasted through the term of the Nawabs rule from 1739 to 1800.
Dry Land: Any land which did not have access to plentiful water was classed as dry land. This was a wide range going from the most barren desert like land to somewhat fertile land with access to a well or similar source. Under the Nawab, dry land was usually discounted from land revenue and instead considered the village property on payment of a fixed amount to the rulers (Raghavaiyangar 1893) (H.R. Pate 1917). The villagers then had a sophisticated system where shares were allotted in the lands to individual farmers. Dry lands were divided into four classes based on their fertility: a) Karisal;b) Veppal; c) Pottal; and d) Sevval, this last category being barren land.
Now that we have the basics out of the way, without further ado let’s take a trip down memory lane.
The first British experiment in 1801 CE in revenue extortion was a hotch-potch of the Nawab’s revenue system and the British Collector Lushington’s ideas. This was the amani system. As usual dry lands and wetlands were assessed separately. For wetlands, Lushington surveyed the district and made a rough estimate of the revenue payable by the farmers. For dry lands, he used the existing classification and in 1804 CE added a fifth category to the existing four categories. The farmers from one village were tasked with classifying the lands of their neighboring village into various tarams (i.e., categories). The gamut of revenue rates started at Rs.2-5-0 per acre for wetlands and ended at 10 Annas for the most infertile dry lands. On top of this were piled several taxes such as moturpha, nilavari, deshkaval, and village taxes.
Lushington, increased the revenue due by the palegar villages by 117% (H.R. Pate 1917). Another round of settlement was conducted in 1802 and 11 palaiyams were handed back to palegars, till finally by 1803 CE twenty-five remaining palegars were converted into the British Zamindar format.
Lushington first surveyed the district and fixed the revenue based on estimated produce. Another practice of the amani system was loans given out by the British to farmers for cultivation. This was taken back with interest when the revenue was collected. The British collected half the revenue in money and the other half in grains which was hoarded at the East India Company’s warehouses, being sold when there was a scarcity of grain on the market. Much like the late unlamented Renter, the Collector unleashed a mob of peons in the district whose job was to ascertain the amount harvested by the farmers. Due to the closeness of the harvesting months, the peons stayed back in the villages till the January harvest (H.R. Pate 1917).
Crops were harvested twice a year, once in September and the second time in January (Stuart 1879). The crops harvested around January/February were known as the pisanam crops and those harvested in September known as the kar crops. The Company’s share of the pisanam crop was around 60% and the farmers had to pay the land tax in cash by June. The British impounded the grain equivalent of tax from the farmers and stored them in guarded warehouses till the farmers were able to pay the tax. This forced farmers to dump grain on the market causing a glut and lowering the market price. The British held onto grains from the kar cultivation and waited till there was a scarcity in the market, at which point they sold for a profit.
Figure 5 Amount of grain left with the farmer after paying land revenue.
The farmers were hit with a double whammy: the land tax they paid was unrealistically high and the price they got from the market was low. This explains why the farmers began to be perpetually in debt and had to sell their survival reserves to meet the land demand. This is graphically illustrated by Figure 5 where the farmer, except for 1807-1808, had a chronic shortfall of grain to the tune of 15% towards the end of the period.
Figure 6 Net income of farmers per acre 1801-1810
Looking at the data from the perspective of earnings per acre (Figure 6), instead in terms of grain, the farmer was consistently in debt throughout the period. The farmers income only came once out of the red and that was in 1807-08 CE when collections had to be postponed due to severe agricultural distress.
Figure 7 Ryotwari land revenue as percentage of average yield from 1801 to 1810.
Figure 7 shows how much produce per acre that was set aside to pay the land revenue. Except for a brief dip in 1807-08 CE, the land revenue per acre averaged around 35% of total produce, touching a high of 45% in 1809-11.
By 1809, the Amani system was then abandoned in favor of, first a triennial system (every 3 years), and then a decennial (10 year) village lease system. The British being the sole owners of the land, all the village lands were leased out to the farmers for a fixed sum. This fixed sum was known as the rent and was nothing but tax on the land. In April 1809 CE, the rent was fixed on an arbitrary high basis based on the fluctuating figures of the last decade. This caused tremendous distress when the market prices of grain fell as in 1817 CE when the farmers could not pay their taxes. The leading men of villages were forced to cough up a fixed amount as tax on behalf of the village. The farmers then had to distribute the due amount amongst themselves and reimburse the headman.
The British tried to experiment with the ryotwari system in 1817 CE, but this was opposed by villagers who demanded a 25% reduction in the tax assessment as compared to the decennial lease system. The villagers of Vallanad did try to implement ryotwari but quickly dropped it. There seems to have been a violent reaction to the new system as the Mirasdars of Sermadevi had fled to the kingdom of Travancore (in Kerala) and only returned when the collector promised to rebuild their houses. The Board of Directors of EEIC protested against the ryotwari system in the following words:
“ To dissolve this unity of interest and common stock of labor by requiring each to take, instead of the share which he possessed and owned, a defined part of the whole land of the village, would not be very different from dissolving a Joint Stock Company in England, and requiring each proprietor to trade upon his own portion of it in order to be separately taxed.” (Stuart 1879)
Figure 8 Ryotwari land revenue as percentage of average yield from 1810 to 1821.
Figure 8 shows how much produce per acre that was set aside to pay the land revenue. Except for a brief dip in 1811-12 CE, when the rates were lowered to ease the introduction of the triennial lease system, the land revenue per acre averaged around 39% of total produce, touching a high of 49% in 1815-16 CE. The land revenue of course makes no allowance for the costs of cultivation.
Figure 9 Amount of grain left with the farmer after paying land revenue 1810-1821 CE.
Figure 9 shows that the farmer, except for a brief respite during 1811-1814 CE, had a chronic shortfall of grain to the tune of 10-15% towards the end of the period.
Figure 10 Net income of farmers per acre 1810-1821 CE
Looking at the data from the perspective of earnings per acre (Figure 10), instead in terms of grain, the farmer was consistently in debt throughout the period. The farmers income only came once out of the red and that was in 1810-14 CE when the trailing of the triennial and decennial lease systems led to a relative relaxation in revenue extortion.
The decennial lease system was discontinued in 1821 CE as a failed experiment. This was replaced by the Olungu system. Figure 11 shows the working of the Olungu system.
Figure 11 The working of the Olungu system of land revenue in Tirunelveli
The system worked as follows:
First a standard market price and the government share of the village crops (known as the melavaram) was fixed. This was arbitrary without any sound basis and in the early years of olungu the standard price was adopted as the average selling price for an unspecified period prior to 1825-26 CE. The melavaram was later on fixed based on assumed output of seven years from 1803-04 to 1810-11 CE, when the amani system was in force. In later years the market price was recalculated every April.
The melavaram was converted into its money equivalent every year taking the standard price as the basis and accounting for any fluctuations in the market price. For example, if the market prices were 11% above the standard price, 1% was added to the standard price.
On the other hand, if the price rise was within 10% or it fell by under 5%, the standard price was used to convert the grain share into money.
If the price fell more than 6% then the standard price was reduced by 1%.
While the system might look appealing on paper, as the land tax would be flexible enough to move up and down with market conditions, the reality was quite different. The reasons for this are not far to seek: the standard price was fixed at an unrealistically high level. If the village did not have access to good water sources, the standard quickly became an albatross around the villagers necks. For villages with wetlands, the entire village was assumed to be equally fertile and assessed at the same rate. At this point in time, during the 1830’s there was no system to classify the lands based on their fertility. Thus, what ended up happening was the existence of over 146 olungu rates in Tirunelveli and with the tax rates being declared in April, the farmers were usually in for a nasty surprise.
Averages, while a useful statistical figure, have little meaning when dealing with diversity in data. Thus, if the most fertile land in the village produced 800 kilos of rice per acre and the worst quality land in the same village produced 400 kilos per acre, the average comes to 600 kilos per acre. This means that the farmer whose plot produces 400 kilos is now paying the tax for an output he will never see in his life. And this is in years when the market price is steady or falling. What happens when the market price shoots up? This rise started from 1843 CE and by 1853 CE had doubled, in 1857 CE shot up by another 40%. Thus, the land tax payable was Rs. 28 lakhs in 1858 CE!
Figure 12 Ryotwari land revenue as percentage of average yield from 1821 to 1859.
Figure 12 shows how much produce per acre that was set aside to pay the land revenue when the Olungu system was in force. The land revenue per acre for the 40-year period averaged around 41% of total produce, touching a high of 52% in 1842-43 CE. The land revenue of course makes no allowance for the costs of cultivation.
Figure 13 Amount of grain left with the farmer after paying land revenue 1821-1859 CE.
Figure 13 shows that the farmer had a shortfall of grain till 1859 CE which was the end of the olungu system. This positive rise was due to a market crash where grain prices dropped by 30% in 1859-60 CE.
“In a place where there are no learned people, even a dull-witted person becomes laudable. In a place where there is no vegetation, even a castor plant passes for a tree.”- Sanskrit proverb (Kashi n.d.).
This Sanskrit subhashita aptly captures Richard Kay Puckle and the 30-year lifetime of his revenue settlement. In 1866 CE, Richard Kay Puckle became the Collector of the district and with that started Puckle Durai’s[2] settlement. Puckle was quite a powerful bureaucrat and seems to have been well connected as he acted as both the Collector and Settlement Officer for Tirunelveli (H.R. Pate 1917).
The period from 1859 to 1864 CE was a time of change as the old olungu system was junked and ryotwari was brought in from 1861 CE onwards. A new system of maintaining two registers, an A register and a B register was started at this time. The B register was a record of the land held by each farmer, this included both cultivated and non-cultivated land. The farmer was taxed based on the total land under his name, whether cultivated or not. The choices before the farmer were simple: pay the tax or let go of the uncultivated land. In a country where Mother Earth is worshipped as Goddess Bhudevi, it is not surprising that most farmers preferred to pay the tax and retain around 250,000 acres of uncultivated land (H.R. Pate 1917). That the British occupiers with their Christian outlook could not fathom this is unsurprising as all Abrahamic faiths are contrary to nature.
The reality was that as usual the British Occupation did not want to spend resources on doing a detailed survey which determined how much land in each farm was actually cultivated (H.R. Pate 1917). It was easier and profitable to simply stick the farmer with a tax bill based on the size of his land. The statistics unsurprisingly showed a jump of 18% in terms of cultivated land and a rise in revenue (H.R. Pate 1917).
Displaying the usual Abrahamic antipathy towards Brahmins and the zeal to save money for the British occupation, Puckle promptly abolished an ancient tax exemption given to Brahmins known as chaturbhagam. From the gazetteers observation that, “Mr. Puckle adopted the policy of enlisting the cooperation of the people in executing at their own cost works of public utility”, it is obvious that he used forced labor to repair waterworks (H.R. Pate 1917).
Puckle divided the district into four divisions based on its geography (H.R. Pate 1917). These were : a) Nirarambam, lands watered by the Tamraparani river; b) Kadarambam– the part not watered by any river; c) Palmyra forest- this was a coastal belt of mostly barren sand dunes with palmyra trees; and d) The belt of black cotton soil land.
He revised the benchmark commutation rate by taking an average of market prices for the decades from 1844-1863 CE. Another innovation was to divide the soil into five classes based on their fertility:
Best
Good
Ordinary
Inferior
Worst
These soil types were then further divided into 7 classes of wet and dry soils known as tarams. Each taram had soils of different types but with the same productivity. For example, black soil with good productivity was classed as “Good Black Loam” and considered comparable to “Best Red Loam (red soil)”. If this seems complicated to us, even the revenue officers had no clue how to implement them. Like all other things in British occupied India, this ended up being arbitrarily applied on the ground. Each taram had two sets of rates, one for a single crop and one for the second crop.
The 14 tarams were not the end of the story, for a further two tarams were added to the dry soils on the assumption that since they had access to irrigation facilities at some point in time, they were considered permanently improved!
There were obvious problems with this approach considering that fact that a village could have good sources of irrigation but very poor-quality soil. Conversely a village with good quality soil could be dependent on the elements for water. As the gazetteer points out the revenue officials had to manipulate the classification to get an applicable rate (H.R. Pate 1917). Ironically, this occasionally worked in the villagers favor if they were lucky to be next to a new canal system. In this case they would be assessed for tax based on the pre-existing water source like ancient man-made reservoirs, known as tanks.
For revenue assessment the villages were broken down into blocks of 10-50 acres and categorized into a taram depending on the soil type and type of irrigation. To address the vexatious question of yield per acre, Puckle undertook experiments and fixed the average yield per acre as 1200 Madras Measures. This works out to 1377 kilos, depending on which conversion of the Madras measure is used, a topic of debate in itself. But this was only for the wetlands, for dry lands the yield per acre was assumed arbitrarily.
The next stage was to fix the revenue payable by each class of soil based on the average market value of paddy from 1844 to 1863 CE. A small deduction of 15% was made to cover the cost of selling the produce in the market and rate of Rs.3.9 per kottai (160 kilos of paddy) was finalized. The cost of cultivation was assumed as Rs.15.4.0 per acre of the most fertile land (the first taram) and reduced by Rs.1 for land classes in order of decreasing fertility. This subtracted from the value of produce gave the “earnings” of the farmer and was further halved and a 5% deduction applied for uncultivatable areas of the field. This long and convoluted calculation finally resulted in the land tax payable by the farmer!
Thus, the land revenue, in monetary terms for each acre was obtained by:
Step 1: (Average yield per acre) X (Average market rate) = Value of produce
Step 2: (Value of Produce per acre – Cost of cultivation per care)/2 = Residual Earnings
Step 3: Residual Earnings – (Residual earnings * .05) = Land Revenue payable by farmer
Now that we understand the mechanics of Puckle’s land revenue innovations, let’s look at the statistics for the 30 year of Puckle Durai’s settlement. Figure 14 shows how much produce per acre that was set aside to pay the land revenue when Puckle’s settlement was in force. The land revenue per acre for the 40-year period averaged around 41% of total produce, touching a high of 52% in 1842-43 CE. The land revenue of course makes no allowance for the costs of cultivation.
Figure 14 Ryotwari land revenue as percentage of average yield from 1860 to 1905 CE.
Figure 14 shows how much produce per acre that was set aside to pay the land revenue when Puckle’s settlement was in force. The land revenue per acre for the 35-year period averaged around 20% of total produce, gradually coming down from a high of 25% in the transition years of the early 1860’s.
Figure 15 Amount of grain left with the farmer after paying land revenue 1860-1905 CE.
Figure 15 shows that the farmer’s shortfall of grain decreasing, and he seems to have a little surplus from 1865 CE onwards.
(Please Note: This section is a work in progress as the latest document regarding revenue in my possession is the 1917 gazetteer edition. The statistics are all in order as I was able to glean them from different statistical reports, but the description of how the settlement functioned will need to be updated for the period from 1915 to 1947)
As Puckle’s revenue regime was fixed at a period of 30 years, at the dawn of the 20th century, a new survey was conducted to update the revenue rates for the next 30 years. The land under cultivation had increased as more and more barren land was being cultivated at subsistence level agriculture by desperate people. To generate income farmers switched from essential foodgrains such as cumbu (pearl millet or bajra) to cotton which is a very demanding resource intensive crop (H.R. Pate 1917). Using the excuse that prices of foodgrains had gone up by 43% in the thirty-year period from 1865 CE to 1905 CE, the tax was increased by 12.5% for wet lands.
Puckle’s system of classification by type of soil and water-source was revamped a bit in this settlement. The water-sources were reclassified based on whether it was a canal, a water tank, or well (H.R. Pate 1917). This closed the “loophole” of villages getting away with paying less tax for water. The rates for the single and the double crop were reduced as well. As Puckle’s settlement had arbitrarily fixed the revenue rates for dry land, the new settlement applied a 12.5% increase similar to wet lands. Due to these increases the British occupations land revenue demand rose from Rs.22,65,000 to Rs.25,56,000 in 1910 CE.
Figure 16 Ryotwari land revenue as percentage of average yield from 1905 to 1947 CE.
Figure 16 shows how much produce per acre that was set aside to pay the land revenue once the settlement was implemented between 1905-1910 CE. This period covers the two world wars and the depression of the 1930’s which sent commodity prices on a rollercoaster ride. The land revenue per acre for the 35-year period averaged around 5-6% of total produce. It needs to be kept in mind that by this time Tirunelveli had been in British occupation for close to 150 years and the land and resources were completely depleted.
Figure 17 Amount of grain left with the farmer after paying land revenue 1905-1947 CE.
Figure 17 shows that the farmer was able to save some grain for a rainy day.
Till this point we have been looking at different time periods and revenue systems. It’s time to put all this together to understand what really went on for 150 years. Figure 18 is a stacked bar chart which shows three key pieces of data:
1) The total revenue for each year, which includes income from sources other than land revenue such as customs, salt, alcohol etc. This is represented by the dark-blue color vertical lines.
2) The land revenue for each year which includes the revenue from ryotwari, inam, and zamindari lands. This is represented by amber-yellow colored vertical lines. To reiterate, ryotwari lands formed 80-85% of the land revenue base.
3) The land revenue as a percentage of total revenue for each year represented by the zig-zag red line.
Figure 18 British land revenue extortion, Tirunelveli district 1801-1947.
I could not locate the data for the 1914-1916 period, and this is the reason for the gap in both the total revenue and the land revenue as a percentage of the total revenue. The interesting observation from the graph is after 1910, land revenue fell from being 70% of the total revenue to somewhere between 40-30%. The reason for this is that other sources such as alcohol, salt, and customs became the main contributors to the revenue pot.
Figure 19 Net amount of grain left with farmer after paying land revenue, Tirunelveli district 1801-1947
Figure 19 shows the net amount of grain the farmer was left with after paying land revenue. Except for brief respites, the first 60 years of British occupation left the farmer in grain deficits in the range of 1-18% and thus perennially in debt with money lenders. While the situation does seem to improve after Puckle Durai took over the district, it’s an illusory picture. A further deduction needs to be made for wastage, fodder etc., which would leave the farmer with 10-15% surplus stock. This is barely sustainable and explains why farmers did not have sufficient buffer stocks to tide over droughts and subsequent famines.
Figure 20 The real income of the farmer from 1801-1931, Tirunelveli District
The last graph in this article, Figure 20, is the most interesting as it gives an approximate idea of the actual earning of the farmer per acre after paying the land revenue. As we have seen in Figure 19, the farmer was in grain deficit for nearly 60 years, and this is mirrored by the negative income (i.e., a loss) for the same period. I have used the index numbers published by the British occupation in India to adjust for inflation and devaluation of the rupee (D. O. Statistics 1933). From 1862 to 1931, which is the last year for the index numbers in the report, it looks like the income is rising and it even touches a high of Rs.7 per acre in the early 1900’s. However, a closer look shows that the income had stagnated between 4-5 rupees per acre.
I had never envisaged doing data analysis of agricultural statistics for any district, let alone Tirunelveli district. While I am a nature lover, agriculture is not something that particularly excites me, I prefer to leave it to my father who is a “farmers son”.
The choice of this topic was accidental. I stumbled across the 150 years’ worth of revenue data for Tirunelveli district in Dharampal’s documents which have been uploaded by Centre for Policy Studies (Dharampal 2011). I was researching the use of forced labor by the British but was intrigued by the dataset.
I make no claims as to the accuracy of my analysis or the underlying statistics. I leave it to the readers to apply their critical thinking and decide on the merits of the article. However, I strongly believe that this article presents a starting point for a district-by-district analysis of the havoc wrought by the British in rural Bharat. Over the years, this can contribute to a more accurate (but still ballpark!) figure of the wealth vacuumed out of Bharat by the British.
While I would prefer to focus on military history, I don’t see myself disentangling from British era records anytime soon. I have already received a suggestion from Prof. Venakata Raghotham, a scholar of Indian history, that I look at Chingleput district in Tamil Nadu next!
The purpose of this short section is to illustrate that statistics by themselves don’t mean anything. And it is a mistake to take the agricultural statistics published during the British occupation at face value. A little bit of analysis shows the data and everything based on it to be a house built on quicksand. The only reliable data is for revenue funneled out of the land.
One of the most dubious aspects of the British era statistics is the figure given for average yield per acre. Unsurprisingly, this was a bone of contention during the British occupation and excites debate amongst the handful of scholars that research this topic in this age.
Why is this figure important? Land revenue was fixed by permanent settlement (which was simply long term, not permanent in the sense of the word) based on the gross yield per acre. For decades, especially from 1801 till 1860’s, this was mostly conjecture of British officials and their native collaborators. Even the land under cultivation was a guestimate as the administration simply wasn’t willing to expend the money involved in hiring many people to survey the districts.
Hence, it often happened that the actual cultivated land was lower than the British estimate. From late 1860’s three things were done :
Resurvey of districts in Madras presidency, in our case Tirunelveli district.
Perform crop-cutting experiments to derive an average yield per acre.
Divide the soil into n-number of categories to work out how much to extort from even barren lands.
The variance in the assumptions for the yield per acre can be seen in the wide range estimates of researchers and the various experiments conducted during the British occupation. Gautam Pingle has nicely summarized pre-British 18th century and stats from British rule in 19th century in his paper (Pingle 2017). Yanasigawa presented average based his research in archival documents which were settlement reports and crop and season reports for various years (Yanasigawa 2011). Both Yanasigawa and Pingle have quoted a third researcher, Sumit Guha’s for the years 1868, 1870. I have not been able to access Guha’s works as of date.
TirunelveliDistrict
Year
18681
18702
18703
18721
1901
1911
1917
1945-49
1955-57
Average produce in Kilos of paddy per acre
1173
802
710
1173
647
747
–
527
679
Table 1 Average yield per acre Tirunelveli district 1868-1957 (Yanasigawa 2011) (Pingle 2017).
Table 1 above is a composite table which combines Yanagisawa’s and Pingle’s data for Tirunelveli district. Yanagisawa had presented another set of statistics ( (Yanasigawa 2011) which give the give a guestimate of normal yields per acre based on adjusting the average yields from the season and crop reports for seasonal factors. This is for rice not unhusked paddy. Yanasigawa used two different conversions to convert paddy into rice for the years . I have converted the weights from pounds (lbs) to kilograms for easier comprehension.
TirunelveliDistrict
Year
1905-09
1911-17
1917-19
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-39
1940-44
1945-49
1950-52
1953-54
Average produce in Kilos of rice per acre
410
607
534
570
560
543
534
559
481
493
601
Average produce in Kilos of paddy per acre
943
1396
1228
1311
1288
1249
1228
1286
1106
1134
1382
Table 2 Average produce per acre in terms of kilos of rice (Yanasigawa 2011). Rice has been converted to paddy based on Yanagisawa’s conversion of 2.3lbs of paddy for every lb. of rice.
This average is illusory as we need to remember about the diverse soil types: from barren sandy hills to extremely fertile black soil. Pingle’s article has details on experiments conducted by Maclean in Tirunelveli in 1868 on different soil types, based on this average yield of paddy per acre comes to 963 kilos.
Directorate of Economics & Statistics. 2017. Pocket Book of Agricultural Statistics. New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare.
Directorate of Economics and Statistics. 2007. Cost of Cultivation of Principal Crops in India. Annual Report, New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India.
H.R. Pate, ICS. 1917. Madras District Gazzetteers Tinnevelly Volume 1. Madras: Government Press.
M.S.Jain. 1994. Surplus to subsistance: A critique of British land revenue policy in Rajasthan, 1870-1910 . Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan.
Mustafa, M. 2007. “The shaping of land revenue policy in Madras Presidency: Revenue experiments—the case of Chittoor District.” The Indian Economic & Social History Review 213-236.
P Arumugam, S.M. Karthik. 2016. “Stochastic Modelling in Yearly Rainfall at Tirunelveli District,Tamil Nadu, India.” International Conference on Processing of Materials, Minerals and Energy. 1852-1858.
Pingle, Gautam. 2017. “Paddy Yields in Pre-industrial South India.” Economic and Political Weekly 36-45.
Presidency, Commissioners for The Investigation of Alleged Cases of Torture in The Madras. 1855. Copy of the Report of the Commission for the Investigation of Alleged Cases of Torture at Madras. Madras: Fort St George Gazette Press.
Raghavaiyangar, S S. 1893. Memorandum on the Progress of Madras Presidency during the Last Forty Years of British Administration. Chennai: Superintendent Government Press.
Statistics, Department Of Commercial Intelligence. 1933. Index Numbers of Indian Prices 1861-1931. Delhi: Manager of publications.
Statistics, Director of. 1963. A STATISTICAL ATLAS OF THE MADRAS STATE REVISED AND RROUGHT UP TO THE END OF FASLI 1360 (1950-51). Chennai (Madras): CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY AND PRINTING,GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.
Stuart, A.J. 1879. Manual of the Tinnevelly District. Madras: Government Press.
Welfare, Department of Agriculture & Cooperation and Farmers. 2021. Statement Showing Minimum Support Prices – Fixed by Government (Rs.quintal). January 8. Accessed December 17, 2022. https://farmer.gov.in/mspstatements.aspx.
[1] Many of the Bharatiya names are unrecognizable in the British documents as they have been corrupted by atrocious mispronunciation.
[2] For farmers used to bottom of the barrel British officials, Puckle looked like an absolute godsend. The Gazetteer remarks that Puckle was referred to as Puckle Durai (leader/chief in Tamil) by the local people.
I have revived the one-shot comic strip titled “Aaj Ka Popat” which made a brief appearance in 2010 i.e 14 years back. How time flies!
I aim to produce this on a regular basis, at least a couple of them a month. The first point of publishing the cartoons will be on http://www.aajkapopat.wordpress.com
Depending on the frequency with which I can create and release the strips, I will be publishing them here in a digest form once or twice a month. This is to avoid spamming subscribers who will visit both this blog and the Popat blog.
I have started a new video series covering the Raichur war between the Vijayanagara Empire and the Bijapur Sultanate. This is based on my old article published in this blog along with a few updates.
This video series will shed light on the wholesale loot and destruction of Roman temples by Christians during the 4th and 5th centuries of the Common Era. Ancient Rome/Greece/Egypt were extensions of the Sanatana Dharma of India and this is easily perceived by understanding their Devatas and the rituals they practiced when worshiping the Devatas. That connection has been deliberately forgotten and erased in the last 200-300 years. This video series will highlight some of the connections I can perceive with my limited knowledge.
The first video in this series will explore the history of Serapeum. This was the majestic temple of the devata Serapis and was the wonder of the ancient Roman empire. Today its bulldozed ruins are a testament to the enormous cultural and physical genocide caused by Christianity.
I have started a video series which gives an easy to understand introduction to the foundation of the Vijayanagara empire. I will be posting all the videos under this series in this post.
I have started a video series on YouTube on the topic of forced labour by the British occupation in India. I will be covering the stuff in the blog articles on forced labour in bite-sized chunks over the next few months. I will embed all the subsequent videos on this topic in this post to avoid spamming you.
This is continuation of the series on Forced Labour by the British in Bharata. The earlier parts can be accessed here: Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3.
1. British Official Attitude towards Forced Labour
The British attitude towards forced labour is quite interesting. In most of the documents in the Dharampal collection, the one thing that comes out very clearly is that the British officials saw the practice as illegal.
There are very few exceptions to this rule. After accepting that the practice is illegal, most collectors then either rationalized the practice as a “necessary evil” or demanded tougher laws to ensure that the practice is legalized. Those who demanded tougher laws also asked for tougher punishments to Bharatiya’s who refuse to comply with this evil British practice. The punishments ranged from financial penalties to outright jail time.
1.Forced Labour is Necessary
From time to time, in response to public anger against forced labour, the higher authorities of the BOF used to make inquiries with district level officials such as collectors regarding forced labour in their domains. Each inquiry used to generate multiple responses from collectors of different districts in a presidency. While responses varied in describing how forced labour was carried out and the type of forced labour used, one thing was common in most responses: everyone seemed to agree that forced labour was necessary.
The term “necessary” had different meanings depending on the local context. For example, for some officials this meant that forced labour was necessary to save money and for others it meant that it was the only way Bharatiya’s could be forced to work for extremely low pay rates.
Among those who held the view that an enormous amount of money was saved was the commissioner of Kumaon in Himachal Pradesh, G.T Lushington. He wrote in 1843 CE to the Board of Revenue that,
“Fully admitting as I do the hardship and inconvenience accruing to the people from the system adverted to, I at the same time feel that it could not be abolished, wholly or in part, without entailing some additional expense to the state and on this ground unless special permission authorizing me to propose a less objectionable and more costly system be granted, I do not venture to make any further suggestions regarding it”[i].
IOR:NWP Revenue Proceedings: P/218/42 (15.7 to 10.8.1843) Nos 143-6 ( 8 pages)
This callous indifference and hypocritical attitude to the suffering of Bharatiya’s was typical of the British occupation.
The case of the West Yamuna canal in the 1840’s where hundreds of thousands of Bharatiya’s were forced to slave has already been discussed previously. Reacting against the court order that prohibited impressing people to work on the canal, the superintendent of canal works emphasized that is was absolutely necessary, despite the practice being officially declared as illegal in the tyranny of William Bentinck who was the Governor-General of Bharat from 1828 to 1835 CE. The superintendent says that:
“ There is no doubt that a most stringent order was issued several years ago by Lord William Bentinck when Governor General of India, prohibiting the seizure of coolies and carriage, but it is of course well known both to the government and to the military board, that it has occasionally been found not only expedient, but absolutely necessary to act in direct violation of this general order ( as in repairing the embankments in the Burhanpur division and in the marches of the governors general, commanders in chief and other great personages)”26.
Thus the superintendent admits freely that everyone from the Governor-General right down to the lowest British clerk in Bharat had their snout in the trough.
Fast-forwarding to the 1870’s and we find the acting collector of Tiruchirappalli in Tamil Nadu giving the same justification for forced labour 49. He makes it clear that whenever the river levels drop (usually in summer), hundreds of people are forced to dig the river bed to ensure water supply. The tehsildars were the British instrument in this oppression.
In response to a demi-official inquiry from the private secretary of the Governor General of India in 1887 CE, the response from Assam was that while “the practice was objectionable” and “open to abuse” it was not possible to abolish it completely[ii]. The extent of this practice and how integral it had become to the functioning of the British occupation in Bharat is seen from the reply of the secretary to Chief Commissioner of Assam to a query from the secretary of the Government of India. The Chief Commissioner of Assam stressed the importance of not interfering with the prevailing practice of impressment. He made it clear that if the practice was stopped and declared illegal, it would result in stopping of all survey work, civil and police officials stranded in their headquarters, military supplies come to a standstill, and roads falling into ruin. His recommendation was to let sleeping dogs lie as stopping the practice would “not benefit the people”.
In different part of Bharat, there existed certain loopholes for people to escape impressment. One such loophole in Kumaon was payment of a certain amount of money to be exempted from the requirement for forced labour[iii]. However, since all forced labour was “necessary” the Commissioner of Kumaon, W.H Batten, justified forced labour by arguing that the money collected would not compensate for the amount lost by stopping all forced labour. Additionally like the example from Assam cited in the preceding paragraph, this official also rationalised that the “general pressure on inhabitants is not so great”.
Replying to another round of inquiries regarding forced labour, this time in Assam in 1882 CE, the commissioner of Assam valley districts, emphasised that the present system ( of forced labour) should not be tampered with as he could not think of a workable alternative [iv]. The commissioner further admits that the system is illegal and attempts to legalise it are not justified. He also proposes encouraging migration of people from other parts of the country who will willingly work as low paid coolies. This scheme was implemented by the British occupiers in different parts of Bharat, as due to the annihilation of industries there was a massive pool of people looking for work in order to survive.
2. Forced Labour is Illegal
There was a small minority of decent British officials who were keenly aware that the practice was inhumane and completely illegal. The administrators who fell into this category were opposed to the legalisation of forced labour. As the collector of Godavari district in Andhra Pradesh remarked in 1872 CE to a circular from the board of revenue inquiring about forced labour: “I have always maintained and am of the same opinion still, that unpaid labour is a mistake, and that to attempt to legally enforce it is a step unworthy of a civilized government”24. He squarely placed the blame for the ruin of the traditional water storage methods such as tanks on forced customary labour. The collector shows unusual honesty when he says that as the British government already collects tax from the farmers, it is the responsibility of the British government to pay money and get work done.
Replying to the same query from the board of revenue, the collector of North Arcot district explains that the Taram assessment (tax) collected by the BOG was, “made up of a tax on the soil, plus a rate for the water which the government undertook to provide for raising wet crop”47. Thus, forcing people to work for free on one hand on the excuse that it was their responsibility while also collecting tax for the same was patently illegal and unethical.
However, before we start applauding the collector, it must be pointed out that the collector spoke about two different kinds of forced labour:
One was unpaid forced labour which was classified as customary labour i.e. what was supposedly done for generations before British occupation;
The other category was paid forced labour in cases of emergency such as a bunds breaking or floods.
While the collector was opposed to people being forced to work under the pretence of customary labour, he advocated stringent punishment for those who refused to perform unpaid labour in emergencies. Referring to the assistant collectors communication which was enclosed in his letter to the Board of Revenue, he stated “As regards compulsory paid labour in cases of emergency I agree with the head assistant collector, whose report on the subject I enclose, in thinking that the provisions of Act I of 1858 are not sufficiently stringent to attain the object”24. The collector of Kadapa, in 1872 CE, had the same opinion and stressed that while he was in favour of forced labour during emergencies (such as bunds breaking), he was against enforcing customary labour.
A similar inquiry done by in Bombay Presidency in 1874 CE elicited similar responses from collectors in Maharashtra. The Collector of Ahmednagar was unusually candid when he said “the system is illegal, and no rules can legalise it”[v].
Nearly thirty years prior to the inquiry by the board of revenue in Madras Presidency, the sessions Judge of Kanpur, in 1843 CE, expressed the same sentiments when he gave a judgement on the illegality of forcing traders and artisans to accompany military detachments or those of high level officials such as the Governor-General when they moved around the country 23. He is explicit when he says that,
“(the practice of forced labour) is not…sanctioned either by law or justice, nor is it a case where the public service requires such a sacrifice of private rights”.
3. Innovative Workaround to Legal Problems
As we saw in the above section, British administrators were aware that the system of forcing and impressing people was illegal. However, they had compartmentalized forced labour into different categories such as:
Customary labour,
Free forced labour,
Unpaid forced labour,
Forced labour for emergencies.
With this cocktail of categories, their worldview regarding forced labour was extremely perverse. Thus, while some collectors might abhor forcing people to work in the name of customary labour, the same officials would not blink an eye to imprison people for refusing to work for free in an “emergency”. Out of this dharmayuddha in the minds of the officials came novel proposals to either legalise forced labour or to circumvent the illegality of the practice.
We saw in the earlier section how the superintendent of the canals, West of Yamuna threatened to quit if he was not allowed to gather people by force. The story behind this is quite interesting, as he was actually reacting to a court order by the Nizamat Adalat in North-West provinces prohibiting forced labour. The local court in 1844 CE prohibited the forced impressments of artisans and trades people by military authorities. However, in a good exemplar of how justice operated in the BOB, under pressure from the military authorities, the judge modified this order to exclude military “emergencies”. The superintendent of the canals was told that this exception did not apply to forced labour for canal works. This is the point where the superintendent writes back detailing the enormous number of people forced to work on canals. He further expresses the wish that every canal officer is given a free hand in collecting any number of labourers, without fearing consequences from law.
One easy way to get over the illegality of the practice was to simply suppress all information. In the Dharampal records, there is a copy of a judgement from Maharashtra regarding forced labour [vi]. It is not clear what year the date of the record is and what the judgement overall is about. However, what it records is crystal clear. It turns out that villagers from villages near Mahabaleshwar (in Maharashtra) were forced to work as coolies and provide carts to Europeans who left the hill station in monsoon. The villagers were dragged away from their villages just as cultivation was about to begin and forced to provide every bullock for long distance travel. The court in its judgement upbraided the collector of Thana for suppressing these facts. The superintendent of Mahabaleshwar on his part, washed his hands off the affair. The ingenious ruse applied in this case was to force people from Satara, which was a princely state, to work as coolies .This meant there were no complaints from British territory and any complaints from Satara were in all probability simply ignored.
Demands were made to have forced labour legalised, as this would then insulate the British officials from any civil court cases. The Collector of South Arcot district[1] was not alone when he expressed in 1872 CE the desire to have a law which would enable collectors to force people to work for “customary labour” and exempt them from any legal liability[vii].
It needs to be understood that the British judicial system was not being swamped by cases filed by Bharatiya’s protesting against forced labour. The White occupiers were simply looking to cover their backs.
In the same year (and responding to the same query from the board of revenue) the collector of Vishakhapatnam points out for the need to have a law which defines the elusive beast that is customary labour and empowers collectors to press-gang people. The collector further explains the creative method employed to get repairs to water-works done for free by villagers:
“…there is no means of enforcing the execution of such repairs by the villagers except indirectly by refusing remission when loss of crops has been the result of negligence to perform customary repairs”38.
This threat of remission i.e. a reduction in the tax paid by farmers, was a common weapon is attested by another collector from Tiruchirappalli district[2], who gleefully remarks that the threat is “found very useful in securing the required labour”49. This despite the fact that in Tiruchirappalli district villagers paid a tax called “irrigation cess”, which ranged from 1 to 5 annas per acre of wet land. The money collected from this tax was used to maintain the canal and waterworks.
The passing of years did not bring any change in the British babudom’s attitude. The acting head assistant collector of Tanjavur district[3] expressed in 1876 CE the same longing for a law to legalise the inclusion of a tax in pattas or land deeds held by farmers[viii]. This collector obviously was not aware of the creative solution implemented by his predecessor in Tiruchirappalli in 1872 CE. Nearer to the Tanjavur collectors time and place, the collector of Salem, C.T.Longley, had actually created a draft proposal which he had christened the “Cauvery Channels Act”[ix]. The proposed act was comprehensive and basically gave collectors the power to strip villagers bare if needed. Some of the salient features of the proposed act were:
The officer in charge of the channels would be empowered to requisition any material needed to construct and maintain the canals. This included trees and leaves, bamboos, straw etc.
The officer would also have the power to cut down trees if needed and helpfully give receipts to the hapless villagers.
The villagers will not be able to run for justice in the courts as the act would provide immunity to the British officer.
Any disputes regarding this will be settled by the collector or an officer who is empowered to act as the collector.
It is not known whether this scheme took off the ground. Longley also recommended that the fees for repair and maintenance of canals be included in the patta of the farmers.
[iii] TH Batten, Esq .Commissioner ,Kumaon division to W.Muir,Esq. Secretary, Sudder Board of revenue, NWP,Agra: 30-09-1851 ( Pro: Vol 491,Cons 97; Letter No 255 of 1851)
[iv] No.366G,dated Guwahati, 03/07/1882 From- W.E Ward, esq,c.s, commissioner of the Assam Valley Districts, To- The Secretary to the chief commissioner of Assam
[v] Revenue Department No.493 of 1874, Letter to revenue commissioner southern division, from G.Norman, Collector of Ahmadnagar 24-02-1874
[vii] From A.L.Lister, Esq., assistant sub-collector, to the collector of south arcot, dated Virdachellum, 4th March 1872, No.90
[viii] C-26 From M.R.Weld,.Esq., acting head assistant collector of Tanjore,to H.S. Thomas,Esq., collector of Tanjore,dated Mayaveram, 15-01-1876,No.16
[ix] From C.T.Longley , Esq., collector of Salem,to the acting secretary to the board of revenue, dated Salem, 03-09-1875,No.338
This is continuation of the series on Forced Labour by the British in Bharata. The earlier parts can be accessed here: Part 1, and Part 2.
1. Effects of forced labour
Desolation of villages:
The most damaging effect of forced labour was that entire villages and settlements were abandoned as people ran away to escape being brutalised by the Christian whites. The problem was particularly acute in villages which bordered major highways. Tradesmen such as blacksmiths were particularly vulnerable to being dragged away by the British soldiers[i]. A very early record of villagers abandoning settlements is available from a Board of Revenue proceeding from 1795. This was a direct consequence of the fear generated in the people’s minds due to the brutality of the BOF and also due to complete loss of livelihood. This record states the condition of those part of the Nizam of Hyderabad’s domains which saw frequent visits by the EIC military detachments. The record states that:
“It is no uncommon thing, on the approach of a detachment, or of travellers, to see the people of a village immediately run off from the fear of being pressed to carry burdens and conceal themselves.”[ii]
A judicial note from 1849 records the desolation of settlements near Mumbai in the 1820’s:
“An observation by Captain Clune in his “itinerary for Western India”, 1826, he observes that a part of the road between Dhulia and Bhiwandi, a place called Kussura (Kasara?) is deserted as the people have run away to different locations to save themselves from being pressed as labourers. This was a common occurrence on various places along the high roads and was confirmed by Collectors, who however pointed out that in 1841 the village of Kussura had been re-inhabited.”[iii]
The atmosphere of fear particularly that associated with being forced by the military to work as coolies was such that people avoided going even to the government Katcheri. A demi-official note from Assam states that, “I know during the Naga hills expedition the Golaghat cutcherry was nearly deserted. Neither complainants nor witnesses would go near the place for fear of being impressed as coolies, and trade was seriously interfered with”[iv].
Economic losses:
Another evil effect of this practice was the monetary loss suffered by the Bharatiyas. A regular practice was to forcibly confiscate carts for use by white soldiers, government officials and soldiers. The cart owners were not compensated and neither paid detention allowance[v]. The usually practice was to have low level peons confiscate the cart. These bottom feeding traitors were infamous for overturning laden carts and dumping their contents on the road[vi]. Additionally these peons extorted money from other villagers by holding the threat of cart and cattle confiscation on their heads. The proof that this practice was pan-India is attested by a letter from the Collector of Kanara in 1874, where he clearly mentions that carts cannot be procured unless by force and this results in economic losses and hardship for the family[vii]. An even earlier occurrence of this practice was reported in 1839 CE by the acting collector of Tiruchirappalli (in Tamil Nadu):
“An equally melancholy case presents itself in the losses sustained by the bandy owners in the detention of their bundies and the suspension in most instances of their trading concerns, during the absence of their bandies.”[viii]
A bandi or bandy means a cart, in this case a bullock cart, which were central to transport in 19th century what trucks and tempos are today.
A more serious effect was that the practices of forced requisition and forced labour worsened the famine situations. An illustrative example is from a collectors report from 1874 CE where the collector identifies the calamity that a government official’s camp with its 100 odd bullocks to feed will bring on a village[ix]. This was just two years before the terrible famine of 1876 which killed around 10 million Bharatiya’s.
An exchange between the governments for Northwest Provinces (Uttar Pradesh) with the Military board is quite revealing in the magnitude of losses sustained by trade people due to forced labour for military purposes. The document lists at least 34 different types of tradesmen (blacksmiths, sweet sellers, money changers, bakers, sooji makers, pan sellers, mochis etc.) who suffered considerable loss of business when the British troops dragged them along on the march[x]. The letter makes it clear that none of these people were paid any remuneration for their trouble. This practice was commonly followed by the English civil servants and even whites who were not government servants. This fact of tradesmen being gang pressed to work for free is attested by an English doctor who observed that blacksmiths lived under constant fear of being forced to labour for free for the white tyrants[xi]. The blacksmiths were forced to carry baggage for white civilians and officers at the time of the year when their skills were in the greatest demand. The Collector for Jabalpur describes the practice as it was in 1836 in the following words:
“I am sorry to say that in some cases the European civil functionaries were just as bad. Another great abuse was also in vogue, vis, that whatever an English gentlemen might require even when residing at his own station sheep, fowls, workmen, building materials, were procured by orders to the police and revenue officers of which the consequence of course was that the sum paid for labour or articles, was below the fair price.”[xii]
It was public knowledge amongst British officials that the practice of forcing shopkeepers and tradespeople to work for free was illegal. However, to maintain the White class system no official took any action against those responsible for this dirty practice.
“As far as I know no magistrate besides myself has absolutely refused to exercise undue influence, or to do, what is, I believe avowedly illegal. Usual course was for the kotwal of the city to collect all the trades’ people; and they were forced to make up a purse among themselves with which they indemnified an individual of each craft, who was thus persuaded to go with the camp”[xiii].
In addition to economic losses, farming and cultivation also suffered. The key reason was that farmers were dragged away from their villages when cultivation was about to begin. They were as usual not paid for their troubles and made to work as coolies12.
The ryotwari system practically beggared the villagers as after taxation there was no surplus left for the villagers. The Bharatiya farmer was in effect performing “slave labour” for the British.
Destruction of traditional water sources:
One of the pernicious side effects of forced labour was the gradual disuse and destruction of traditional water sources. Water tanks and channels from rivers were one of the chief sources of water for farms. With the British rulers extracting taxes and at the same time forcing people to maintain the water sources for free, the tanks and channels fell in disrepair. This was one of the many reasons why millions of acres of fertile land was turned to wasteland during the British rule.
The true estimate of the “worth” of the British rulers can be gauged from this statement by the Collector of Godavari district in Andhra Pradesh in 1876:
“I have always maintained, and am of the same opinion still, that unpaid labour is a mistake, and that to attempt legally to enforce it is a step unworthy of a civilized government. That it is a mistake the wretched condition of our tanks all over the country bears testimony.”[xiv]
Another report from 1869 commented on the fact that the villages under zamindars were “verdant” and “fertile” while government lands were barren and desolate due to the poor state of water sources[xv].
“In one case (the Zamindari estates) there was abundance of water and the tanks and channels were in good repair. In the other ( government lands), customary labour had to a great extent fallen into disuse, the annual government grants for the repair of irrigation works had proved totally insufficient and consequently the tanks and channels got worse each year. Hence, government as a landlord, contrasted unfavourably with zemindars.”24
These observations were not that of one person, but of a whole gamut of decent officials who had the honesty to admit the results of the CBR actions. The collector of Godavari district wrote to the Board of Revenue opposing forced labour and advocating a maintenance allowance for water tanks23.
[i] IOR:Dufferin papers: MSS Eur F130/8A. The eyewitness account of Dr.Heynes recounts blacksmiths abandoning their homes to escape forced labour.
[ii] India Office Records: P/285/17 Madras Board of Revenue Proceedings 1st October 1795. (MRO: BRP: Vol.137: Pro 1.10.1795,No.12-13,pp 7354-64)
[v] Acting collector, Trichinopoly to Board of revenue: 17.12.1838. ( MRO:BRP:Vol 1642,Pro 3.1.1839, No. 44, pp 96-99).
[vi] Revenue Department No.506 of 1874. Letter to the Chief secretary to government from J.Moore, Acting Collector,of Khandesh, N.D, 10-04-1874,Camp Borad.
[vii] Revenue Department No.1006 of 1874.Letter to chief secretary of government, from A.R.MACDONALD Collector of Kanara, 24-03-1874.
[viii] Acting collector, Trichinopoly to Board of revenue: 17.12.1838. ( MRO:BRP:Vol 1642,Pro 3.1.1839, No. 44, pp 96-99)
[ix] No.240 of 1874,Memorandum, Ahmadabad collectors office,camp dhundhooka,17-02-1874.
[x] Govt NWP to Military board: 15.6.1844, no.2275
Note:By the end of this year, I will be bringing out a book on the subject of forced labour, wherein I will also explain the analysis methodology in detail. If you are interested in the book ( as and when it comes out) please fill in this form.
The readers who fill up the form will be offered a discount of 40% once the book is published.
To carry baggage of the Civilian White administrators: A good summary of some of the purposes for which forced labour (called “impressment”) was employed is given by a note from the Collector of Tinnevally in 1860:
“Impressment was employed for the service of government not for the service of travelers; for example to supply carriage to a regiment ordered to march, to convey treasure to the presidency, to carry salt from the pans to the beach for shipment etc.”[i]
A judicial note from 1849 CE observes that it was extremely suspicious that none of the magistrates had reported a single case of forced labour in Bombay Presidency. It doubts whether people are even aware of the plethora of legislation which prohibits forced labour[ii]. Also, villagers near Mahabaleshwar were forced to work as forced labour for Europeans who left the hill station in monsoon. They were dragged away from their villages just as cultivation was about to begin and forced to provide every bullock for long distance travel. The court upbraided the collector of Thana for suppressing these facts, while the superintendent of Mahabaleshwar washed his hands off the affair. The ingenious ruse applied in this case was to force people from Satara, which was a princely state and theoretically independent, to work as coolies. This meant there were no complaints from British occupied territory.
One of the most common uses was to carry baggage for the Katcheri (government office) as it moved from place to place. Villages which were unfortunate to fall in the route of the katcheri as it meandered through the country were forced to provide free labour to carry the baggage of the katcheri. The baggage usually consisted of the Collectors files, personal luggage and heavy items which were necessary for this institution to function. As the Principal Collector of North Arcot district wrote,
“Coolies for conveying the Katcheri baggage are not the regular coolies of the country. They are ryots, village watchers or any day labourers belonging to the village the Katcheri has to pass through. They are not accustomed to carry loads and consequently what is put upon them is not equal to that of a regular hired coolie”[iii].
To put this in context one only has to imagine going to the train station to drop a relation and the local police catching hold of you and forcing you to carry 30-40 kilos of luggage of an IPS officer on your head. And this was not for short distances, it was for at least 20-30 kilometres till the next stop of the Katcheri.
The collector of Savanuru, Karnataka, writing in 1874, has given a good idea of the number of bullock carts which were impressed to carry the official’s baggage[iv]. The number of carts varied depending on how junior or senior the officer was in the food chain. Needless to say, the more senior an officer was (for example collector) the more carts he impressed. Table 2 gives the approximate number of carts impressed by each grade of district official.
Carts Office
Carts personal
Total
Collector
10
12
22
1st assistant collector
2
8
10
2nd assistant collector
2
6
8
Supernumerary collector
1
5
6
District deputy collector
2
4
6
Total
17
35
52
Table 2 the number of carts needed by different district officials while travelling from place to place.
The magic number of 52 carts is representative of only one district, there were scores of such districts in each Presidency in British occupied Bharat. In fact, Savanuru was part of the Kanara district of Bombay Presidency in the 19th century and remained so for some years after Independence. The British-era Kanara district virtually covered the entire coastline of Karnataka and stretched a little into coastal Kerala as well. The collector of Kanara writes in 1874 CE that the collectors were travelling for nearly eight months of the year and each collector required a minimum of 5 carts [v]. He further adds that, “The necessary transport cannot be procured anywhere in Kanara without compulsion”. The core issue in all of this was really saving money for the British Occupation government. If it meant forcing people to provide transport for free, well that was for their own good.
Forced labour for White civilians.
While the use of forced labour by government officials might be rationalised on one level, as possibly one of the evils of the BOB, what is surprising is that white people who were not government servants, made full use of free labour.
The Collector of South Kanara remarks in 1860 CE that as bullocks were hard to find in South Kanara, people were forced to work as coolies and pull the carts of European travellers [vi]. He further adds that people only agree to this inhumane and degrading practice as they believe that they are required to do so by the British government. This practice was not only winked at by British administrators but also actively advocated to prevent “inconvenience” to white travellers. In the same year, the assistant collector of Vishakhapatnam writes to his superior officer, that, as the availability of palakhi bearers is patchy throughout the district it is necessary to force people to act as bearers for white travellers[vii].
As was usual practice in other parts of Bharat, people were corralled by means of lower-level minions such as peons at each stage of travel in the district. The white attitude is made clear in the officials’ statement when he says that:
“To remove bearers from all control whatever, would be to place travelers entirely at their mercy, which would subject them to insufferable annoyance and insolence, and would open a door to unbridled extortion and combination, besides subjecting females in particular to the risk of being helplessly left in unhealthy localities, objects of contempt and ridicule, and of incurring constant collision between male travelers and bearers”.
C-26 From M.R.Weld,.Esq., acting head assistant collector of Tanjore,to H.S. Thomas,Esq., collector of Tanjore,dated Mayaveram, 15-01-1876,No.16
He snidely adds that people must be happy with the current situation as otherwise someone would have complained by now!
White memsahibs also made utilised the free labour service as productively as possible. In my personal experience, having interacted with white “civilization” over the past two decades, it is the women who are the most racist. Anyway, coming back to the point, the memsahibs sent off their peons to drag the nearest tailor from his shop and forced him to sew curtains[viii]. The tailor would rarely be paid and if he was it was below the market rate.
What was the British opinion of Bharatiyas?
The British vultures characterised Bharatiya’s as notorious complainers, apathetic and lazy dolts, selfish, short sighted and insolent. A particularly positive characterisation was of us as “obedient children”. And how did these genocidal buggers see themselves? As “enlightened rulers”!
Notorious Complainers
Consider a case from 1830’s Rajamahendravaram, Andhra Pradesh. The Collector C.Grant is desperately trying to cover his back against a complaint by Jagannatha Rao. The complaint relates to government officials using people as forced unpaid labour (remember the British concept of “caste” wasn’t applied wholesale to Bharatiya society at that time).The Collector is also accused of withholding petitions by Bharatiyas against government excesses. And how does this rat C.Grant characterise the upright Jagannatha Rao?
“The rancourous spirits and the unworthy motives which seem to have dictated the petitions of the informant did not at all surpise me, when I saw the notorious names appended to them…The informant, who is a Brahmin, comes forward as the avowed defender of the ryots of the lowest class of the community which his own caste have trampled upon for ages.”[i]
So there you go! How dare the oppressive Brahmin fight for the rights of the downtrodden? Not happening in the enlightened English rule. Of course nothing ever comes out of these complaints.
Lazy and Apathetic
Bharatiya’s were reluctant to provide free labour to the government for which they were paying heavy taxes as well. This reluctance was attributed to us being lazy and apathetic for the common good (i.e. the British rulers). The reality was this: the British government in exchange for all sorts of taxes and cesses undertook the responsibility of maintain agricultural and irrigation works. This was previously done by the villagers who pooled in their efforts. But will all independence and incentive taken away from the village system there was nothing left except pay taxes and provide free labour. A related characterisation of Bharatiya’s was as “selfish and short-sighted”. The British officers believed that it was their birth right to make us work for free[i].
“The whole difficulty as to the enforcement of the rules for the management of tank calingulas and as to the non-observance by the people of their ancient obligations to make the petty repairs to their irrigation works from time to time required arises, I think from the following causes: their indolence, their short sighted and selfish indifference to the feelings and interests and wishes of others, and their proneness to faction and consequent inability to combine.”[ii]
To remedy this situation the innovative British officers suggested framing new laws or enforcing existing ones like Act I of 1858 to force Bharatiya’s to labour for free. A sample of their thought process is given in the report by the Collector of Masulipatanam below:
“From the late collectors circulars in the gazette, and from what I hear from the superintending engineer, I fancy the ryots here are very apathetic about giving their labour; but I think that, if section 6 of Act I of 1858,was enforced here and there, and the villagers are charged twice the value of earth work done by imported labour, they will learn to get rid of their apathy.”[iii]
Obedient children
At the other end of the spectrum was the classification of Bharatiya’s as docile animals who would follow the white man’s orders. One officer from Belgaum in 1874 CE identified that the obedience stemmed from the farmers resignation to being exploited by their rulers.
“Here if carts are required a certain amount of compulsion is often necessary; i.e. the order is given, and the cultivators send their carts with little or no objection, as they regard the having to do so as a necessary evil, and it is one to which they have always been accustomed.”[i]
On the other hand the Collector of Tanjore in 1877 CE lamented in his report that the natives were becoming less “obedient” compared to previous times.
“In the old days the collectors order was all that was wanted; like good children the ryots never hesitated to yield a willing obedience, and the recusant few, if there were such a breed, were hustled into good behaviour by the common sense of the village.”[ii]
[i] Revenue Department No.495 of 1874,Letter to chief secretary of government, revenue department, Bombay, from H.B.Boswell, acting Collector of Belguam, 15-04-1874.
[ii] From H.S.Thomas.Esq., collector of Tanjore,to the acting secretary to the board of revenue, dated Tanjore, 13-03-1876,No.1013
[i] Revenue Department No.506 of 1874,Letter to the Chief secretary to government from J.Moore, Acting Collector,of Khandesh, N.D, 10-04-1874,Camp Borad.
[ii] From H.W.Bliss , Esq., acting collector of Madura,to the acting secretary to the board of revenue,dated 28-01-1876,No.34.
[iii] From G.D.Leman,Esq. acting collector of the Kistna district,to the secretary of board of revenue ,dated Masulipatam,27-03-1872,No.1038
[i] Complaint of Jagannath Rao on forced unremunerated labour,Rajamahendravaram ( MRO:BP:Vol 1558, Pro:15.5.1837,Nos.37,pp.5300-3).
[i] No.1974 From J.Silver, Esq., collector of Tinnevelly, dated Tinnevelly,25/04/1860,No.153
[iii] Principal collector,North Arcot to Board of revenue: 17.17.1837. ( MRO:BRP:Vol 1566,Pro 31.7.1837, No. 47, pp 8658-9)
[iv] Revenue Department No.1211 of 1874,Letter to revenue commissioner, S.D., from E.P.Robertson, Collector of Savanur, 20-04-1874
[v] Revenue Department No.1006 of 1874,Letter to chief secretary of government, from A.R.MACDONALD Collector of Kanara, 24-03-1874
[vi] Consultation of board of revenue 15-05-1860, No.2270, From D.Williams, Esq., Ag.Hd.Asst.Collector in charge of South Canara,08/05/1860,No.67
[vii] C-26 Consultation of board of revenue 23-05-1860 Enc.1 From R.Davidson,Esq.,Offg.Asst.Collector of Vizagapatam. To E.G.R Pane,Esq.Collector of Vizagapatam,dated Vizagapatam, 05-05-1860
[viii] No.3285,dated 30th august 1883 From- H.E. Perries, esq, commissioner and superintendent, Rawalpindi division.
Eminent historian Sri Dharampal (Image taken from here)
Before launching into the article, I would like to remember the legendary historian of Bharata -Sri Dharampal. Readers will probably be familiar with his ground-breaking work on Bharatiya society on the eve of British occupation.
Over the course of decades, he diligently collected original material on British India and brought to light how the Christian British destroyed our industry, education system, distorted our culture and subverted Hinduism for their own ends. Most the material he collected from the India Office records ( stored in the British Library in London) in the United Kingdom. Without any prospect of remuneration or financial support he laboured on due to his love for the motherland.
This is what Claude Alvares, a scholar and publisher, whose publication house has brought out several of Dharampal’s works, has to say about the tapasya of Dharampal:
“He did not have much of an income. There was also a family to support. But notwithstanding all this, he became a regular visitor to the India Office and the British Museum. Photocopying required money. Oftentimes, old manuscripts could not be photocopied. So he copied them in long hand, page after page, millions of words, day after day. Thereafter, he would have the copied notes typed. He thus retrieved and accumulated thousands of pages of information from the archival record. When he returned to India, his most prized possession was these notes, which filled several large trunks and suitcases.[i]“
From anecdotes on Twitter, his last years were particularly hard in terms of financial assistance towards his research. Not surprising, for the fate of gyana margi people in today’s Bharata is usually one of financial penury and societal neglect. When time permits, I will post the translation of a lament by G.H.Khare, an eminent historian (in the correct sense, unlike the Christo-Islamo-fascist eminences who pass for scholars) on the hardships he faced throughout his life.
A lot of the material Sri Dharampal selected has been put online by Centre for Policy Studies, Chennai. This amounts to nearly 15,500 pages of original British era records like Commissioners reports, collector reports, judicial reports etc. These have been very neatly categorized by the topic and size of the documentation. For every page Dharampal selected from the British archives, he would have to go through at several irrelevant pages. A lot of these he copied by hand and typed them up. Quite a few were cyclostyled by him.
Over the coming years I will be going through all this material and publish my analysis online and in book form.
Note: Some of the references are out of whack as I am still getting used to the new fangled WordPress editor. As they say you cant stop progress. I will sort these out as I get familiar with progress.
In this series of articles, I will be tackling the slavery of Bharatiyas by the British. This is euphemistically referred to in British records as “Forced Labour”. Just as Colonialism is a nice sounding label for outright genocide, similarly, forced labour is a term which blunts the true nature of the atrocities committed by the British. My curiosity in this topic was ignited years ago by a stray sentence in the introduction of one of Dharampal’s books (don’t remember which), where he mentions this as a topic which needs further investigation. Sometime in 2015, I came across the giant repository of Dharmapals documents uploaded by CPS and stumbled upon a folder titled “Dharampal Envelopes”. This again has several sub-folders which tackle different aspects of British oppression in Bharat. It is envelope series C-25 to C-30 which form the entire corpus relating to forced labour in Bharat. This runs close to 700 pages in total.
I went through around 700 pages of original British era records in the Dharampal archive to draw a true picture of how the British used Bharatiyas like beasts of burden, all free of cost. This analysis brings out some shocking and repulsive facts about how the British brought down our ancestors to the level of load carrying donkeys. I did this analysis on and off for nearly 6 years as it is very depressing subject for me personally. This is hardly the stuff that will brighten your day.
Along with the hidden facts of slavery of Bharatiya’s other darker secrets also emerged: the mass rape of Bharatiya women by the Christian British. This is another line of research and in the coming years I will bring out a detailed book on this subject. On a sidenote, these reasons ( alongwith the destruction of our economy) were the real reasons for the Bharatiya-Anglo war of 1857 CE. It is only morons who think that a pig and cow fat greased bullet caused people to magically rise in disgust and murder the white invaders.
I will spread out the content across several articles as it is too big to fit in one blog post. The method I used to analyse the documents is Grounded Theory , which if done properly brings out hidden aspects of the data.
By the end of this year, I will be bringing out a book on the subject of forced labour, wherein I will also explain the analysis methodology in detail. If you are interested in the book ( as and when it comes out) please fill in this form.
The readers who fill up the form will be offered a discount of 40% once the book is published.
All right, lets begin our journey to understanding forced labour in British occupied Bharat. In places I have used the terms “BOB” which stands for “British Occupied Bharat“.
What is forced labour?
Lets start with a textbook definition. Very simply put whenever you are forced to work against your will is recognised as forced labour. One of the definitions given by the International Labour organisation (ILO) for forced labour is:
“Forced or compulsory labour is all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily.” International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29).”[i]
Right, so big deal! How does this concern us? What’s this got to do with things that happened in Bharat more than a century ago?
Let’s simplify things with an imaginary scenario. Imagine you are driving on the outskirts of Bhagyanagar in your swanky new car. You see a roadblock ahead manned by cops. You dutifully stop your car. Next thing you know is you are dragged out, your wife gets molested, and the cops commandeer your car. Beaten and bruised you are dumped on the side of the road, while the cops jump in the car and drive off to the next city, say Warangal.
Let’s take this a bit further. You send your wife back home to Bhagyanagar and hitch a ride to the Warangal. On making inquiries you find out that the car is standing in the police commissioners office. You present yourself in front of the police commissioner, who promptly throws you into a cell. Where, of course, you receive the next round of beatings. Twice beaten, once shy, you walk out of the police station and from the corner of your eye you see a surprise. Dumped near the wall is the body of the car with all its parts stripped out. Wiping a tear, you limp into the wide world.
Another scenario while we are at it: A night in the balmy Bharatiya summer. After a long day you are dozing in the compound of your house. A series of loud bangs on the door rouses you from deep slumber. Groggy and bumbling you open the front door of the house. Next thing you know is you are being pulled by a couple of peons from some government department and dragged outside the house. In the morning you find yourself with a 40-kilo weight strapped to your back and trudging through the rising heat. You look back and see a line of unfortunates like you cursing their fate. The stragglers scream as a peon lashes at their backs with a whip. Leading the front is the District Collector sitting comfortably in his Ambassador car.
In both situations you don’t get a single rupee or ten rupees for your troubles.
Outlandish? Difficult to imagine today? Replace the cars with bullock carts and turn the clock back a hundred years and you get an idea what it means when the English talk about forced labour in Bharat. While the current crop of bureaucrats and police officers, in Bharat, are a law unto themselves, they are toddlers (anari in Hindi) compared to their white forebears.
In this part and the following parts, I will touch on each aspect of this oppression practised by the Christian British in Bharat.
What was forced labour used for?
Forced labour was used to run the British occupation in Bharat. This included:
Government works (canals, railways, roads, bridges etc.)
For government officers and their families
Movement of troops
European travellers. Any white person in BOB was referred to as a European. The term travellers meant these were not connected to the British administration but were people travelling on personal business.
I will be addressing each of these points one by one. It is important to note that very rarely were Bharatiyas remunerated for their misery. Most of the time it was free slavery to the British. It didn’t matter if you were in the North, South, West or East of Bharata. The Christian British were equal opportunity enslavers. The below statement made in 1844 CE by a Magistrate in Uttar Pradesh leaves no doubt as to what went on:
“It is believed that the commissariat officers on the formation of large camps and the aggregation of large bodies of troops have been in the habit of requiring the intervention of magisterial authority in procuring the attendance of trade people and artificers of various denominations to accompany such camps without remuneration… with such requisitions the magistrates have complied without objection and without reference to the illegality and injustice of such impressment.”[i]
1. Forced labour for government works
In terms of sheer numbers this category overwhelms all the other categories. Indians in their lakhs were forced to work as “free” labourers on government projects and regular maintenance of existing infrastructure. This included:
Construction of canals.
Railways.
Repair of existing water sources.
For the trigonometrical survey of Bharat.
Constructing houses of the rapist British soldiers and officials.
Working as porters for British officials who moved from place to place.
Repair and Maintenance of Waterworks: An illustrative example is that of the repair and restoration of the West Yamuna canal in the 1840’s. The issue of forced labour caused heated correspondence between the Superintendent of West Yamuna canal works and the local magistrate. This debate was sparked off by a Court order in 1844 CE which prohibited the forced impressments of artisans and trades people by military authorities. But a bureaucrat by the name of J.Thronton wrote back to the court saying that for emergency purposes it was still necessary to employ forced labour. So, by 1845 CE the Judge accordingly modified his order to exclude military “emergencies”20. As was typical of the devious British government machinery almost everything was fitted into this convenient category.
To this court order, a stronger reaction came from the Superintendent of Canals, west of the Yamuna, who threatened to quit if he was not given a free hand to collect people. He further expressed the wish that every canal officer is given a free hand in collecting any number of labourers, without fearing consequences from law. The Magistrate of Karnaul (Karnal near Delhi?), M B. Thornbull wrote back saying the canal works pay forced labourers 7 paise, whereas the “nerrick” (market rate) was 2 annas 6 paise and hence no one was prepared to work.
The superintendent clearly mentions that 5, 18, 204 people were pressed as forced labourers for constructing the canal. This equated to roughly 43,000 people gathered monthly[ii]. And how were these people rounded up?
“I have no hesitation in stating for the information of government, that to the best of my belief not a single large party has been collected unless by sowars, burkandazes, chaprasis, khalasis, malis or beldars of the canal establishment for purpose of bringing them together…” Comment by the Superintendent of Works, West Yamuna canal22.
The superintendent threatened to stop work on the canal if he was prevented from getting forced labour.
This was a pan-Bharat phenomenon and continued for a long time as evidenced from notes and records from all the four ends of the country. The British officials of North West Frontier provinces (now in Pakistan) have recorded in their letters of the growing anger in people due to impressment for canal works and repairs 89 . A note from the collector of the Godavari district in 1872 CE to the Board of Revenue clearly spelt out the free work that villagers were expected to do on canals and waterworks 24:
Digging and repairing of channels by which water is immediately distributed to the fields from tanks or irrigation channels.
Turfing the leaky bunds of tanks in order to prevent breaches,
Making ring bunds when breaches occur.
The collector is very clear about the manner in which people were coerced when he says that, “No instance has come under my own observation in which the ryots of their own accord turfed the bund of a tank, but it is said to be recognized as a duty”27.
Repair and construction of roads: In building roads the normal tactic to save money was to bundle of portions of the road to nearest village. Free labour was exacted for building roads throughout Bharat. This included the main highways (called as trunk roads and the ones connecting the villages to each other). A document from 1849 CE mentions that till that time forced labour was used for building trunk roads in Salem district. The note further states that since Rs.9000 had been allotted for the repair of trunk roads, there was no need to force people to work for free 28.
Another alternative to get work done free of cost was to use convicts for road and public works. This was eerily similar to the “slave labour” employed by the Soviet Union where prisoners were forced to dig canals, build roads and do just about anything that the communist party desired (Library of Congress, 2010). An example of use of convicts with details of how much money was saved is given in a report by the public works department on the feasibility of using prisoners to build roads. This report deals with Salem in Tamil Nadu mentions that due to high death rate of prisoners, the use of convicts for road repairs and construction was temporarily stopped in 1844 CE. That this experiment was already tried elsewhere is demonstrated by the report writers statement that,
“the employment of convicts in gangs, at a distance from their gaols has been peremptorily prohibited by the Honourable court of directors and the government of India. Chiefly on account of the sickness and mortality which followed the adoption of a similar plan in Bengal”[iii].
The following table gives details of the death rate vis-a-vis the total number of prisoners in the prison in Salem. The total number of deaths comes to a staggering 19,845 people in a short span of 7 years.
Proportion of deaths to Numerical Strengths
Convicts employed on road labour
Prisoners in gaols
First half of 1839
870
2665
Second half of 1839
500
2630
1839
1370
5295
First half of 1840
927
2743
Second half of 1840
686
3310
1840
1613
6053
First half of 1841
500
2016
Second half of 1841
1810
2737
1841
2310
4753
1842
3302
6075
1843
3474
6969
1844
5166
3282
1845
2610
7905
Total Deaths
19,845
Table 1 The death rate of prisoners employed on road construction
The British occupation government saved an enormous amount of money by experimenting in using convicts to do work instead of forced labor from people. As is presented in this volume there is irrefutable evidence that usually all public works were carried out with free labour. The key focus on saving money, nothing else. The conclusion of the board of public works in their report was, “It is satisfactory to find that the labour of the convicts has been very nearly as cheap as free labour”28.
This meant the villagers were responsible for not only building the road for free but also maintaining it. And all the while they were paying high taxes for the “gift of white rule”. This was identified by in a report by the Board of Revenue of EIC:
“When the road passes through jungly, or naturally barren lands, the villages are few, and the population very scant. This road labor then must be very oppressive for great lengths of road are portioned off to small villages and the workmen have to waste much time in going to and from.”[iv]
Like most other uses of forced labour, the use of forced labour for making road was a pan-Bharat phenomenon. This is attested by other documents which are from the other extremes of Bharat i.e., Himachal Pradesh, Arakan hills tracts (Myanmar), Dera Ismail Khan, and Assam.
In case of emergencies such as floods and major damage to roads it was almost certain that villagers would be corralled into the repair effort. In Dera Ismail Khan, sometime in 1883 CE, large number of villagers were forced to repair roads and a bridge which had been swept away in a flash flood [v]. This large number was usually in the thousands not hundreds. From the letter it is clear that this was hardly an one-off occurrence.
In the 1860’s, Sir Henry Ramsey, placed in charge of Kumaon as Commissioner, ruled as a petty tyrant. He constructed dak bungalows and large number of roads from where British officials exercised tyranny over Indians. Kuli, bardaish and begar were different appellations of forced labour, mean, impressed labour with miniscule wages, labour without payment, and grabbing food articles etc. by Government officials without paying for them.
Begar was compelling of people to labour without any payment. Miles and miles of roads were cut into mountainsides by using free and forced labour. In the case of Assam, the deputy commissioner of Gaolpara states in 1881 CE that there were “two instances” of people being forced to work on repairing roads in the district [vi]. It needs to be kept in mind that the commissioner was referring to parwanahs which were essentially records of the orders given to grab people. However, a vast majority of instances were never recorded, being accomplished with verbal instructions to the subordinate Bharatiya officers.
Another instance is from Madras Presidency where a government circular from around 1849 CE which asks officials not to use forced labour in main highways also notes that use of free labour for the major trunk roads was a common practice[vii]. In 1880’s, in Kumaon (Himachal Pradesh) a similar practice existed where the villagers were forced to maintain district roads, while the trunk roads were maintained by the government [viii].
To maintain canals and water storage: A response to a demi-official circular from 1887 CE asking collectors about the practice of forced labour in Punjab admits that it is common practice for the maintenance and clearance of canals. The local term used for this was “cher”[ix]. The legal backing for this practice is cited as Part VIII of the Canal Act of 1873. The same demi-official circular evoked interesting responses for government officials across Bharata. One response from Bombay Presidency asserted that in addition to forced labour for transporting baggage of Europeans, for troops and forced confiscation of carts, it was also used to maintain canals [x]. This was the response from Madras presidency as well where the legal backing was cited as the Act I of 1858.The justification for forced labour is that people are paid rates which are higher than the market rate.
A very common use of forced labour for government works was done under the excuse of “customary village labour”. The word customary had nothing to do with what was traditionally the villager’s responsibility, it had everything to do with what the British civil servants thought the villagers should do. Customary forced labour was commonly used to maintain the water channels, clear riverbeds, repair breaches in the canals and dams etc.
Additionally, even British officials admitted that there was no clarity as to what customary labour constituted[xi]. The acting collector of Godavari district, H.E Sullivan, characterised customary labour in 1872 CE as a “flimsy pretence” to force people to work for free [xii] . It needs to be kept in mind that the villagers were paying a wide assortment of taxes to the British rulers to maintain the waterworks. Collectors and tehsildars routinely used the threat of punishment to force the villagers to look after the irrigation works [xiii]. By the second half of the 19th century forced labour had become a way of life for most Bharatiya’s. Hence, it is not surprising when the Acting Collector for Godavari district informed the Board of Revenue in Chennai 1872 CE that:
“(In this district) the obligation to furnish unpaid labour for petty repairs to irrigation work is recognized by the ryots, and there is no practical difficulty in exacting it.”[xiv]
A detailed list of what all the villagers were forced to do is given in a reply to the question of forced labour around 1874 [xv]:
Fill up dry gullies or repair other injuries caused by rain or the action of the water to the tank bunds and supply channels.
To clear bunds and channel banks of prickly pear and other weeds.
To remove accumulations and deposits in supply channels and sluices.
To perform minor repairs to the amount of rupees 15 or 20.
To strengthen tank bunds in all dangerous places and to watch them carefully in the rainy season, and to turf those parts liable to be acted upon by the waves.
To construct temporary dams across jungle streams to catch water.
To construct ring dams where necessary.
To clear sluices and to close or keep open calingulahs with reference to the state of supply in tanks.
Erecting embankments in the beds of rivers to lead the water to the head of channels.
The fact that these extensive works were standard across the board in South India is shown by the consistency in the replies given by various collectors to the Board of Revenue’s query to collectors in the Madras Presidency in the early 1870’s. The list of activities clubbed under the label “customary labour” is consistent with a few variations according to the geographic location. Punitive fines which had no legal basis were levied on the farmers who refused to slave for free. Farmers were beaten into submission by the British overlords or their Bharatiya minions. They had little say in the matter as they were ignorant of their rights. One such fine was levied in Nellore district was called a “nagalu” and was levied by the Tehsildars to bring errant farmers into line [xvi].
Most collectors were of the view that fines should be imposed on those ryots who refused to perform free labour. In fact, often fines were imposed, irrespective of their legality, and the collector’s acted as demi-gods who could fine and punish the ryots. One method to make the ryots submit was to force them to pay double the cost of the earthworks or refuse to lighten their tax load in times of distress[xvii]. One collector even recommended that revenue officers should be given legal powers to impose a fine four times the value of the work and the ability to auction off the zamindars and ryots properties to realise the money [xviii].
Prior to British rule (i.e. before 1800’s) the usual practice was for farmers to maintain the village tanks and other water storage sources. The key point to understand is that taxation in money was unknown in Bharata and the ruling powers (the Hindu ones) did not expect the farmers to pay tax and also maintain the water tanks, canals etc. The revenue was taken in form of grains and an amount set aside for repairs of the water tanks. In a letter from 1872 the collector of Chennai observes that there existed 2,885 small tanks which “were constructed by individuals or village communities and not by the Circar (the British government), and many of them are ancient ruined tanks restored by the ryots”[xix].
In the early 1800’s the asura Munro introduced the ryotwari system which was the caused tremendous damage to the social and economic fabric of Bharata. This imposed a fixed money assessment i.e. every year the farmers paid a fixed amount depending on their landholding. This amount was paid in cash and did not vary with the dire straits that farmers often found themselves in. After the imposition of the fixed assessment the creative and devious government officials came up with ways to make the farmers work for free. One method was to make the farmers responsible for any repair works below a certain sum. For example, in Madras in the 1870’s farmers were expected to carry out repairs under the sum of Rs.25.
This was also attested by the collector of North Arcot in 1872, when he wrote that, “(when a) Taram assessment imposed by the British government the state than assumed the responsibility of maintaining all works of irrigation on this consideration, that the so-called Taram assessment is made up of a tax on the soil, plus a rate for the water which the government undertook to provide for raising wet crop”[xx]. That the government did not fulfil its part of the bargain was evidenced by the complaints made by the farmers regarding the poor maintenance of large water channels [xxi].
Force was almost always necessary to compel people to work for free. On occasions where hundreds of “coolies” were needed for works such as clearing the dry riverbeds, tehsildars were deputed to terrorise the people into submission [xxii]. Farmers paid taxes such as the “irrigation cess” which was around 1 to 5 annas per acre of wet land 44. This cess was used to maintain the water channels and ensure regular distribution to the villages. However in spite of collecting this cess, the British officials utilised “customary labour” to make up for any shortfall in the cess collection. The focus thus was on saving money and maximising revenue for the British machinery in Bharat.
To carry troop supplies: Like rest of the government machinery the most atrocious use of Bharatiya’s was to act as mules for the genocidal white army in Bharat. As the British Indian Army was the sole means by which the British ensured their occupation, no complaints were entertained against the atrocious behaviour of the military 4. The military officers used to pressurise the local civilian officials, such as district magistrates, and get them to round up people to carry their supplies. This was mostly “free” and in many cases resulted in losses for the Bharatiya’s, who had to leave their occupation and slave for the white oppressors. No varna or jati was free from this atrocity and anyone at hand was dragged to work as beasts of burden for the evil British. The troops could be under the command of Bharatiya traitors or White people, but the result was the same: loss of livelihood and acute distress to the Bharatiya people.
“When detachments are marched under the charge of European officers, sometimes pressed coolies are paid and sometimes they are not. Similar treatment occurs when officers are travelling in consequence of removals etc. as well as when other gentlemen pass through the country.”[xxiii]
This practice was common right from the time the English were fighting for military supremacy in Dakshina Bharata. A letter from 1773 CE from Sir Robert Harland to the Earl of Rochford, where the former decries the loot perpetrated by the officers of the East India Company in Arcot [xxiv]. At this point in time Arcot was ruled by the Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan Wallajah. The letter notes that, “The pressing of his people to serve as coolies, and their bullocks to carry baggage, which ought to be employed for the purposes of cultivation,are what would appear to be some of the Nabob’s greatest grievances.”
A note from the collector of Tinnevally in 1837 admits that, “the baggage for troops marching is invariably carried by carts or by coolies, engaged to perform service for the whole distance”[xxv]. This was hardly service done by Bharatiya’s out of love for their oppressors. The usual tactic was to get a white civilian officer to force them to work as slaves. Sometimes the carrot of a slight reduction in their taxes was used as inducement to try and get the Bharatiya’s to work for free.
Occasionally a right minded British civil servant such as a magistrate would protest against being made to forcibly impress Bharatiya’s of all walks in order to serve the British occupation army. One such honourable exception was the Magistrate of Kanpur who in 1843 wrote a strong letter to the commissioner of Allahabad division about the illegality of asking public officers to grab trades people whenever the military asked them to 52. He pointedly remarks that a majority of magistrates simply agree to whatever demands the military made in terms of impressing people. He further describes the method in which this was done, “Usual course was for the kotwal of the city to collect all the trades people; and they were forced to make up a purse among themselves with which they indemnified an individual of each craft, who was thus persuaded to go with the camp” 52. The military officials, referred to as the Commissariat, refused to compensate the tradesmen who were thus forced to accompany army divisions on the march, and insisted that they earn their living by selling goods within the army camp [xxvi]. The magistrate’s letter led the Lt. Governor of North-West Provinces (today’s Uttar Pradesh) to inquire with the Commissariat regarding the magistrate’s accusations. The commissariat flippantly replied that, “We would suggest that the magistrate be advised that it rests entirely with himself to refuse compliance”52. The Magistrate of Kanpur listed thirty-four types of tradesmen who were forced to accompany military units on the march. These tradesmen were forced to carry their tools and supplies for long distances without the guarantee of any payment for their trouble.
It is worth noting that till the advent of the mass manufactured automobile in the 20th century the main vehicle of travel and for carrying supplies was the bullock cart. When fighting with Bharatiya powers in the 18th and early 19th century, the British forced our people to give up their bullocks and carts in their thousands. A good example of this is the forced requisitioning of around 3000 to 20000 bullocks by Munro from Andhra Pradesh during the Second Maratha-Anglo war of 1803-1804 CE (Stein, 1989). Thousands of bullocks died during the war and the lack of bullocks for tilling the fields led to severe famine in coastal Andhra Pradesh (Ceded districts).
This became the routine even when the white tyrants had established their power in Bharat. Every time British troops and their local mercenaries marched through the country, carts and people were forcibly procured and used. In the early 1820’s the Magistrate of Bellary in Karnataka, A.D Campbell, wrote to his seniors about the severe hardships the local people faced from being forced to serve as coolies and to furnish supplies from detachment of troops [xxvii]. He details how in the short span of three months, eight corps and numerous smaller detachments marched through the district. The chief complain of the people was not about providing labour but about not being paid properly and being mistreated by the occupation forces. Campbell listed the following military formations which had marched in the district from around June to end of August 1820 CE: 1st of the 7th N.I, 2nd of the 16th N.I., 3 of the 17th N.I., 1st of the 19th N.I., 1st of the 20th N.I., H.M 3rd regiment, H.M 46th regiment, and 2 light cavalry besides smaller detachments.
The carts and their owners were dragged to wherever the soldiers were marching and this could be hundreds of miles away. They were rarely paid and had to come back empty thus forgoing their livelihood for many days altogether . To escape this tyranny villagers used to dismantle the carts and hide them in the jungle. The British resorted to keeping the “knowledge of the movements of troops in the background, as long as possible, so that district officers may, when the carriage is required, pounce down and seize every available cart” [xxviii]. This continued for a long time and in response to a circular from the Governor Generals office asking for details of forced labour, a reply was received from Bombay Presidency that forced labour was used for movement of troops [xxix].
It was not only carts and coolies that were commandeered by British troops, boats were requisitioned as well. This caused considerable hardship to the boatmen who lost their livelihood for as long as the occupation forces needed their service. The assistant commissioner of Sylhet (now in Bangladesh) writes about an incidence where boats were forcibly requisitioned to facilitate the movement of the 10th regiment of the N.I 55. The Bharatiya lower rung officials such as Mirasdars absconded when the assistant commissioner sent orders to grab boats and boatmen. These absconding officials were then taken to task by the commissioner for “neglecting” their duty. The commissioner details the whole disgraceful episode as ,
“In the cold weather of 1880, when the 10th regiment N.I passed through the Karimganj subdivision en-route to Cachar, about 20 boats were impressed in the sub division and sent to Balaganj (20 hours journey downstream) to assist in transport. Boats and boatmen were impressed with considerable difficulty”.
[ii] India revenue dispatch, March 1846: 1/Ap/NWP/N.4/1846 (extract) Registrar Nizamut adawlut NWP to Magisterial authorities : 24.8.1844, no.1364
[iii] Report from the Board of public works on the experiment of employing convict labour in construction of public roads. Ref: Appendix to the minutes of evidence taken before select committee, Appendix B, no .106,Public Works Department
[iv] Gratis, unpaid labour on road building in Madras Presidency (MRO:BR: PWD Cons: Vol.47, Cons: 25.11.1851, No.10-1, pp.1766-85,extract).
[v] No.385,dated dera ismail khan,10th august 1883 From- Lt.Col E.L. Ommanney, Officiating commissioner and superintendent, Derajat division To- The secretary to government, Punjab
[vi] No.391, dated Dhubri, 14/09/1881 From T.J.Murray, Esq, C.S., Offg. Deputy commissioner of Goalpara, To – the commissioner of the Assam valley districts
[xi] From E.J Melville, Esq., acting collector of Vizagapatnam, to the acting secretary to the board of revenue.dated Vizianagrum, 14th February 1872, No.30
[xii] From H.E.Sullivan,Esq.Acting collector of the Godavery district,to the secretary to the board of revenue,dated Cocanada,22nd April 1872,No.96
[xiii] Proceedings of board of revenue, Consultation of 19-03-1860,No.1258 From J.Silver,Esq.Collector of Tinnevally, dated ?, 13-03-1860, no.96.
[xiv] Consultation of board of revenue 6-05-1876.From H.E.Sullivan,Esq.Acting collector of the Godavery district,to the secretary to the board of revenue, dated Cocanada,22nd April 1872,No.96
[xv] From G.Vans Agnew,Esq. collector of Nellore,to the secretary of board of revenue district,dated Nellore,26-06-1872,No.1441
[xvi] Rom G.Vansagnew, Esq.,Collector of Nellore,to the Secretary to the board of revenue, dated Nellore, 26th June 1872,No.1,441
[xvii] G.D. Leman, Esq. Acting Collector of the Kistna District, to the secretary to the Board of Revenue, Dated Masulipatnam, 27th March 1872, No.1038.
[xviii] J.H Garstin,Esq., Collector of South Arcot, to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, dated Cuddalore, 26th March 1872, no.99
[xix] From W.Mcquhae, Esq., Acting collector of Madras, to the secretary to the board of revenue, dated 24th January 1872, No.21
[xx] From J.D Robinson, Esq., Collector of North Arcot, to the secretary to the board of reveneu, dated Gudiattum, 14th February 1872, No.63
[xxi] From T.A.N Chase, Esq., Collector of Kurnool , to the Secretary to the board of revenue, dated 23rd November 1871, No.386
[xxii] From W.S. Whiteside, Esq., acting collector of Trichinopoly, to the secretary to the board, board of revenue, dated 29th Febraury 1872, No.50
[xxiii] India Office Records: P/285/17 Madras Board of Revenue Proceedings 1st October 1795. (MRO: BRP: Vol.137: Pro 1.10.1795,No.12-13,pp 7354-64)
[xxiv] Home Mic. III East Indies 19,1773,Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rochford (No XII) Recvd 10.4.1773
[xxv] collector,Tinnevelly to Board of revenue: 5.8.1837. ( MRO:Vol 1569,Pro 21.8.1837, No. 31, pp 9556-8)
[xxvi] From the magistrate of Cawnpoor to the commissioner of the 4th or Allahabad division on the administration of criminal justice for 1843, 28-02-1843,general remarks para 15
[xxvii]C-28, Magistrate ,Bellary to Government, 31-8-1820 (MRO: Jud. Con.: Vol no. 151.B, coN 15.9.1820, Nos 9-13, pp.2203-68)
[xxviii] C-26 Letter to Chief secretary to government, Bombay, from J.W.Robertson, Collector, Tanna, 27-05-1874.
Jambudveep's Blog 